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INTRODUCTION
The politics of the 1920's, often caricaturized in a 
few simple generalizations, prove upon thoughtful investiga­
tion to be exceedingly complex.-*- Several common and casual 
assertions about "twenties" politics should come under 
critical reanalysis, including traditional descriptions of 
the extent and character of party division. The usual 
historical generalization is that, although conservativism 
was the predominant political attitude, both parties were 
fragmented by sectional and ideological struggles. As a con­
sequence there was a breakdown in the party system. This 
dissertation tests this conclusion through an examination of 
voting patterns in the United States Senate from the 6?th 
through the 70th Congress (1921-29), Virtually every politi­
cal history of the era touches upon Senate voting align­
ments, but there is no extant study with the scope, structure, 
and methodology of this dissertation.
The need for this investigation stems from severe 
deficiencies in political studies of the 1920's. Many des­
criptions are little more than tedious exposes of debauchery
lFor a perceptive critique of "twenties" historio­
graphy see Kenry F. May, "Shifting Perspectives on the 
1920's," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII 
(December, 195^)» ^05-27•
2and incompetence,  ^ Moreover, nearly every political study 
is written from the liberal "frame of reference." Some 
political critiques of the 1920's can be dismissed as 
fundamentally liberal vendettas, but even responsible 
scholars reflect the same bias which is all but universal 
among practitioners of the historical craft.3 This study 
is neither a defense nor advocacy of a political group or 
philosophy. The conclusions herein are based upon a detached 
analysis of Senate voting patterns and presented with a 
determination for accuracy.
The historian should be eclectic in his methodology. 
Any technique should be adopted which will contribute to 
clarity, precision, and insight into the historical topic. 
Traditional research techniques have usually been used as a 
basis for descriptions of politics and parties in the 1920's. 
The results have often been impressive, but the methodology 
has sometimes contributed to excessive selectivity in 
materials, reliance upon fragmentary data, casualness in 
definitions, and little regard for criteria. The dimensions
classic of this type is Samuel Hopkins Adams, 
Incredible Era: The Life and Times of Warren Gamabiel 
Harding (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939 )~T
3a representative study of the polemic school is Karl 
Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy: An Account of Party 
Politics During Twelve Republican Years: 1920-1932~ TBoston '• 
Little, Brown and Company, 19^8), whereas Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957T~?sflects the
scholarly bias.
3of methodology have recently been expanded by historians who 
have developed new techniques and adopted others, primarily, 
from the social sciences,^ Ideas and methods advanced by 
these historians are incorporated into this dissertation.
This study should be perceived as paralleling standard politi­
cal histories of the 1920*s, but employing different 
methodology with the purpose of revising the traditional 
interpretations. Given this procedure, it is not surprising 
that this study will both suggest new perspectives on politics 
of the 1920's and reenforce certain traditional themes.
Most of this study is an analysis of Senate roll-call 
votes to gauge the influence of party and section upon voting 
behavior. Among the advantages of statistical analysis to 
test historical generalizations are that it; (1 ) imposes 
detachment upon the user thereby contributing to objec­
tivity; (2 ) enables judgments based upon quantitative rather 
than selected evidence; (3 ) ensures an accuracy and precision 
in measurement impossible to obtain by other methods; and 
(^) is a valuable way to gain insight into political behavior 
because legislators must record their decisions on every 
conceivable issue, and votes cannot be rationalized away or
^A standard study using the new methodology is Lee 
Benson, The Concent of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a 
Test Case (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196IT*
For the efficacy of this approach see Ernest Nagel, The 
Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1961J, and William 0. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," 
American Historical Review, LXXI (April, 1966), 803-25.
hobscured, by rhetoric. Quantitative analysis was the most 
efficacious methodology which could be adopted for the design 
and purpose of this investigation.5
This dissertation tests, analyzes, refines and/or 
modifies the standard historical interpretations of patterns 
within the major political parties during the 1920's. Its 
major theme is that both the Republicans and Democrats were 
afflicted with pronounced disunity stemming from ideological 
and sectional antagonism. The principal disruptive group 
within the Republican party consisted of agrarian senators 
who, in the progressive cause, took their party affiliation 
casually and practiced insurgency. Urban and rural Democrats 
were likewise engaged in an ideological power struggle for 
party hegemony. A political party is often a confederation 
of warring factions unified only by the same label and 
acquisitiveness for power; historians usually agree that this 
is a more accurate characterization of politics in the 1920's 
than for most eras.
5The literature upon statistical methodology for 
measuring and analyzing legislative votes is voluminous.
Among the more valuable references in designing this study 
were Stuart A. Rice, Farmers and Workers in American Politics 
New York: Columbia University Press, 19277, and Quantita­
tive Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928);
David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1 9 5 9 Duncan MacRae, Jr.,
Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of 
the House of Representatives in the 81st Congress "(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 19587;~and Julius Turner,
"Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress," Johns 
Hopkins Universiigy Studies in Historical and Political Science, 
LXIX, No. 1 (1951).
5The first chapter of this dissertation is a brief 
historical survey of the United States Senate during the 
1920*s. It is written from a political perspective and 
designed to "set" the Senate milieu. The chapter empha.sizes 
party politics and the Senate's legislative preoccupations, 
and includes relevant "reference" data. This chapter 
provides the historical background and serves as a departure 
for the statistical chapters.
Each subsequent chapter investigates an aspect of 
Senate voting patterns. The degree of division and likeness 
between Republicans and Democrats is measured in chapter two 
to ascertain whether the historical generalizations indicating 
"inordinate" interparty mutuality are valid. Chapter three 
is a redefinition of the standard historical theme relating 
to internal party disunity. This chapter illustrates that, 
even with more internal party conflict than usual, party 
government continued throughout the 1920's. The party 
loyalty of each senator is determined in chapter four. This 
measurement of party influence upon individual senators 
reaffirms that political affiliation was the paramount deter­
minant of voting behavior. It also provides an opportunity 
to judge whether the historical characterizations of 
senators as party regulars or irregulars are valid or need 
revision.
6Chapter five is an examination of Republican insur­
gents in the 1920*s. The common interpretation is that a 
group of Midwestern and Western Republican senators sustained 
the progressive spirit in an era of normalcy through their 
independence of the party organization. Both voting infor­
mation and criteria of insurgency and progressivism are used 
to assess the validity of the almost universal interpretation 
that these senators exemplified liberalism and independence. 
The conclusions from this chapter may point the need for an 
intensive reexamination of progressivism and insurgency, and 
a thorough reevaluation of the reform impulse in the 1920's.
The sixth chapter is an investigation of sectional 
influences in the Senate voting patterns. Nearly every 
historian of the 1920's emphasizes the sectional and/or 
urban-rural discord as a major force in party politics. This 
chapter measures the degree of sectionalism in the Senate 
votes, and determines whether geography or party affiliation 
was the predominant guide to voting behavior during the 
1920‘s.
Because there are a series of internal summaries and 
chapter conclusions, the dissertation conclusion simply 
reiterates the major conclusions from the investigation, and 
indicates possible revisions needed in current historical 
literature on "twenties" politics.
DATA AND PROCEDURE
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The 1364 roll-call votes in the United States Senate 
from 1921 through 1929 were the raw data for the statistical 
analysis in this dissertation* Mere volume of votes alone 
made computer processing the only practical method of 
analysis. It was also the only way to achieve the accuracy 
needed for this study. In preparing the voting data for 
computer programming, information on each vote in the 
Congressional Record was manually duplicated on a work 
sheet. The relevant information on the work sheet was 
manually coded and placed on IBM score forms. These forms 
were processed by computer which transmitted the coded 
information from score forms onto IBM cards. The cards were 
the raw material for computer analysis. A series of 
computer programs were written which translated the stored 
data on the cards into indices of voting behavior.
CHAPTER I
A POLITICAL HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE, 1921-29
This chapter is a brief historical survey of the 
United States Senate from the 6?th through the 70th Congress 
(1921-29)• It includes information on Senate election 
results and party representation in the Upper House. The 
emphasis, however, is upon Senate legislative activities and 
political tumult. Because of the primary reliance upon sta­
tistical analysis in this dissertation, it was decided to 
include this chapter for reference material and to provide a 
historical context for subsequent chapters.
The Republican party controlled the Senate throughout 
the 1920*s. Conforming to the general election pattern for 
the party in power, the Republicans gained large majorities 
in presidential elections which were reduced in off-year 
elections. From a narrow two seat majority in the 66th 
Congress (1919-21), the Republicans increased their numbers 
to 59 against only 37 Democrats in the 6?th Congress 
( 1 9 2 1 - 2 3 ) . There were 60 Republicans briefly when
iThe political composition of the Senate is in His­
torical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1 9 5 7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, i960),
pp. 691-2. A valuable reference on individual senators is 
Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 177^-1961, 
comp. Clifford P. Reynolds (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1961).
9a Democrat resigned and a Republican was appointed in his 
place, but the original alignment was restored when a Democrat 
was elected to the seat. There were nine new senators who 
filled vacant seats caused by deaths and resignations, but 
the party representation was unchanged.
Public resentment, stemming primarily from a depressed 
economy, was responsible, in most historians* judgment, for 
the appreciable reduction of Republicans in the 68th Congress 
(1923-25).^ Republicans held 17 and the Democrats 15 of
the 32 regularly contested seats in the 1922 elections. Repub­
licans retained 9 seats, gained 2 from the Democrats, and lost
8. Democrats gained 7 Republican seats while they held 13 of 
their 15 seats. The final Republican loss was to a Farmer- 
Labor candidate. Aside from the regularly contested seats, 
there were six vacancies from deaths and resignations to be 
filled during the Senate adjournment period. The Republicans 
possessed 5 of these seats, and they lost a seat each to the 
Democrats and Farmer-Laborites, while the Democrats kept their 
seat which had been vacated. This made the Senate composition, 
in the first session, 51 Republicans, 43 Democrats, and 2
2In the Midwest, this public resentment was manifested 
in the election of progressive over conservative Republicans 
for their party nomination. For insights into a series of 
elections see Jerry Alvin Neprash, The Brookhart Campaigns in 
Iowa, 1920-1926: A Study in the Motivation of Political 
Attitudes (Mew York: Columbia University Press, 1932). A 
comprehensive study of the 1922 elections is needed. Many of 
the assumptions about the issues and implications of these 
major elections have not been effectively demonstrated.
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Farmer-Laborites, During the recess period, the Republicans 
added a single senator to their membership from an election 
to fill a seat held by a Democrat serving on an appointment. 
Although there were other changes in the Senate membership, 
Republican and Democratic representation remained stable 
which made the party alignment, in the second session, 52 
Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 2 Farmer-Laborites.
In the 1924 election, the Republicans made an impres­
sive recovery from the 1922 debacle to increase substantially 
their majority in the 69th Congress (1925-27). They raised 
their numerical advantage from 8 to 14 seats. In the first 
session, there were 55 Republicans aligned against 40 Demo­
crats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite. The Republican margin was 
slightly decreased in the second session when the Democrats 
gained 2 seats at Republican expense, and a Republican sena­
tor-elect was denied his seat. This made the Senate party 
composition 52 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 1 Farmer- 
Laborite.
The Republican majority was markedly reduced in the 
1926 elections. They could organize the Senate in the 70th 
Congress (1927-29) only because they had the Farmer-Labor 
vote, and the Democrats were not obstructionists. The party 
alignment was 47 Republicans, 46 Democrats, and 1 Farmer- 
Laborite. Besides the still vacant seat from the 69th Con­
gress, another vacancy occurred when the Republican senator- 
elect from Pennsylvania was prevented from taking his seat.
11
The Republican position improved in the second session when 
a Republican defeated a Democrat in a special election, and 
a Republican filled the vacant Illinois seat. As a result, 
the Senate membership included ky Republicans, ^5 Democrats, 
and 1 Farmer-Laborite.
The Republican Senate majorities In the 1920's were 
based upon predominant political power in all geographical 
regions, excluding only the Democratic South. Although the 
Democratic party occasionally cut into Republican majorities 
outside the South, the former seldom threatened Republican 
•hegemony. The voting evolution of this decade which would 
make the Democrats the majority party in the 1930*s was not 
then yet perceived. From the data in the following tables, 
the extent to which the Republican party dominated the 
nation through control of three (out of four) major geo­
graphical regions is apparent.3
^The East includes Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massa­
chusetts, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Delaware, New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Central States are Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Illinois,
Ohio, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
Indiana, and Minnesota.
The West includes Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Washington, Cali­
fornia, Wyoming, Utah, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, and Montana.
Included in the South are North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Arkansas, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Alabama,
Texas, Tennessee, and Missouri.
All subsequent references to a geographical region will be 
based upon these classifications.
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TABLE 1
POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS —  
UNITES STATES SENATE, 1921-1929
67th Congress (1921-1923)
East Central South West Total
Republicans 17 (18) 20 7 15 59 (60) *
Democrats 3 (2 ) 2 25 7 37 (36)
Total 20 22 32 22 96
68th Congress (1923-1925)
Republicans 15 18 5 13 (1*0 51 (52)**
Democrats 5 2 27 9 (8 ) 43 (42)
Farmer-
Laborites 0 2 0 0 2 (2 )
Total 20 22 32 22 96
69th Congress (1925-1927)
Republicans 16 (15) 19 (18) 7 (6) 13 55 (52)**
Democrats 4 (5) 2 (2) 25 (26) 9 40 (42)
Farmer- 
Laborites 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1)
Total 20 22 (21) 32 22 96 (95)
70th Congress (1927-1929)
Republicans 13 18 (20) 3 13 47 (49)**
Democrats 6 2 (1) 29 9 46 (*>5)
Farmer- 
Laborites 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 (l)
Total 19 21 (22) 32 22 94 (95)
(^Sectional-party alignment in the first and second sessions. 
**Sectional-party alignment in the second session.)
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The Senate was the focus of political activity in the 
1920*s, hut its legislative achievements were unimpressive.
In retrospect, the senators raised few issues that seemed 
vitally germane to the needs of a complex and interrelated 
twentieth century society. The Senate debates were intense 
and the conflicts often authentic, but a kind of unreality 
envelopes the politics of the era. Senate emphasis was 
usually not upon substantive and meaningful issues, but upon 
traditional and often irrelevant issues which the prota­
gonists viewed from antiquated frames of reference. A need 
for original reanalysis of issues was crushed by stereotypes 
and dialogue from a past generation.
There was a minor struggle over organization of the 
Senate in the 67th Congress. The Republican leadership pro­
posed a rules change to increase the membership of the 
standing committees thereby enabling every Republican to 
have an "exclusive" committee assignment which would increase 
the disparity in majority and minority party committee repre­
sentation.^ Democrats conducted a mild filibuster against 
the change, but the Republican majority easily modified the 
rules. Some regular Republicans supported the plan as a 
way to keep the committees under their control by preventing
^Among the most useful works on Senate organization, 
procedures, and practices is George H, Haynes, The Senate of 
the United States; Its History and Practice, 2 vols.
’(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, I9387T
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Democrats and unreliable Republicans from constituting 
committee majorities.5
The Republican leadership moved for the enactment of 
tariff and tax measures in the first session. In their 
determination to revoke what they called the Democratic con­
fiscatory tax schedules, Republican leaders made tax revision 
the paramount legislative concern. After seven weeks of 
continuous debate, the Senate passed a tax bill which 
included provisions which the Republican oligarchy described 
as an anathema. This was because Democrats and undependable 
Republicans allied to determine much of the bill's final 
form.6
Senate attention then concentrated upon tariff legis­
lation. A permanent tariff law was deferred to a later 
session, but the Republicans acted almost unanimously to 
pass a temporary tariff bill over nearly solid Democratic 
opposition. The controversial issue of compensation for 
veterans was raised and debated in the Senate, but the only 
measure that was passed was an innocuous bill to consolidate 
many government units into the Veterans' Bureau, Other 
important pieces of legislation passed by the Senate in this
5Lindsay Rogers, "American Government and Politicss 
The First (Special) Session of the 67th Congress, April 11, 
1921~-November 23, 1921," American Political Science Review, 
XVI (February, 1922), 42.
^Roy G. Blakey, "The Revenue Act of 1921," American 
Economic Review, XII (March, 1922), 75-101.
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session, include amendments to the Volstead Act, grants-in- 
aid to the states for road construction, and emergency 
legislation curtailing immigration«7
Formulation and passage of a tariff bill was the 
major Senate preoccupation during the second session. The 
Fordney-McCumber tariff bill was shaped in the Senate Finance 
Committee for nine months. It was then debated on the 
Senate floor from April through late August 1922 when it 
was passed by the Republicans on a strict party vote. The 
high tariff measure was in a House-Senate conference 
committee for a month before the members returned a compro­
mise bill to the Senate, which the Republicans passed on 
September 19» 1922.^
The Senate again attended to the veterans* bonus issue. 
Although the Senate finally passed a compensation bill, Pres­
ident Warren G. Harding vetoed it, and was able to mobilize 
enough congressional support to sustain his veto. This failed 
to end the agitation for some form of veterans' compensation.
?A summary of the major legislation is available in 
Rogers, American Political Science Review, XVI, No. 1, ^3-*6• 
There are many sources for the background and substance of 
the major laws enacted during the 1920's, but perhaps the 
single most valuable work is Louis M. Hacker, American Prob­
lems of Today; A History of the United States Since the World 
War (New Yorks F. S. Crofts and Company^ 19^1).
^The politics and procedure involved in passage of 
the bill is in Abraham Berglund, "The Tariff Act of 1922," 
American Economic Review, XIII (March, 1923), 1^-33•
16
Bonus proponents raised the issue later in the 1920's with 
more success.^
The third and fourth sessions of the 67th Congress 
were unproductive. Passage of the ship subsidy bill was the 
only purpose for the third session. When a Southern fili­
buster against the Dyer Anti-Lynching bill precluded any 
legislative business, the leaders in both parties agreed to 
dispense with the Dyer bill and adjourn. In the fourth 
session, the Senate passed a voluminous amount of minor
legislation.-I-®
The Farm Bloc was responsible for much of the legis­
lation passed in the 67th Congress. There were 22 senators 
from both parties in the Bloc, and they were committed to the 
enactment of measures which would provide economic relief for 
agriculture.^  The group's strategy was to act in unison to
9A description of the bonus controversy is in Lindsay 
Rogers, "American Government and Politics: later Sessions of 
the 67th Congress," American Political Science Review, XVIII 
(February, 1924), 81"-"4. ~~~
l^The legislation in the later sessions is summarized 
in Ibid., pp. 80-1.
13-There is a multitude of literature on the membership, 
objectives, and Farm Bloc achievements. Some insights from 
the leader of the Bloc may be found in Arthur Capper, The 
Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
T92Tf7~~^Among the standard sources on this group are Wesley 
McCune, The Farm Bloc, 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday,
Doran and Company, 1943); John D. Hicks and Theodore Saloutes, 
Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West 1900-1939 (Madi­
son: University of Wisconsin Press, 195lT» anc^  James H.
Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957)*
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force concessions from the Republican leadership, and some 
Republicans were not above the threat to make support of 
their party contingent upon enactment of agrarian bills. It 
was effective pressure politics, and a series of measures to 
assist agriculture was passed into law, including increased 
tariff duties on farm products, extension of credit, regula­
tion of packing houses and grain exchanges, and exemption of 
farm cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. This legisla­
tion did not prevent a continuous decline in farm incomes 
during the 1920*s, and the rural senators subsequently pro­
posed other solutions to end the agricultural depression.
The Senate had an unimpressive legislative record in 
the 68th Congress, which was characterized by conflicts with 
the executive branch and Republican factionalism. Depending 
upon the issue, the Republican majority was more illusory 
than real because it depended upon the fidelity of a few 
senators who were known for their unreliability. When these 
senators were disposed, they could usually form a Senate 
majority with receptive Democrats. Defections by this group, 
however, should not be overemphasized because many Adminis­
tration defeats resulted from revolts by reliable Republicans. 
The Senate refusal to consider American entry into the World 
Court, passage of the bonus bill over President Calvin 
Coolidge*s veto, and the mutilation of Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew Mellon*s tax proposal were the work of both
18
Republican reliables and unreliables. A political analyst 
concluded that the Republican senators seldom missed an 
opportunity to ignore the President's recommendations or 
repudiate him when the lines were d r a w n .
Although the Republican senators united against their 
party leader, they were intensely divided among themselves.
This division became a fierce struggle when the Senate was 
being organized. A few Republicans opposed Albert B. Cummins 
(Iowa) for chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee even 
though seniority and custom entitled him to the position.
After a month of conflict, Republicans Robert M. La Follette 
(Wis.), Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.), Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.), and 
Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa) broke with the party to vote for 
Democrat Ellison D. Smith (S.C.) and thereby elect him 
committee chairman.^3
In late November 192A, the second controversy was 
ignited when the regular Republicans announced their intention 
to discipline their colleagues who failed to endorse Coolidge 
in the presidential campaign, or openly supported La Follette,
■^Lindsay Rogers, "American Government and Politics:
First and Second Sessions of the Sixty-Eighth Congress,
December 3, 1923 to June 7, 192A: December 1, 192A to March 
A, 1925," American Political Science Review, XIX (November,
1925), 762.
^clarence A. Berdahl, "American Government and Politics: 
Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress, I," American 
Political Science Review, XLIII (April, 19^9)» 320.
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the Progressive party presidential candidate. In addition 
to La Follette, the Republican conference identified Brook- 
hart, Fra-zier, and Ladd as those to be excluded from future 
Republican conferences and ineligible to fill Republican 
vacancies on Senate committees.^  Punishment was postponed 
to the 69th Congress.
The Senate passed only a few important measures 
in the 68th Congress. In the first session, the sena­
tors were preoccupied with the tax revision bill based 
upon Mellon's suggestions. The final Senate bill 
•differed substantially from the Mellon plan, including 
lesser reductions for upper income classes and larger 
reductions for lower income groups.15 An almost unanimous 
Senate also approved the immigration bill which imposed 
an immigration quota at two per cent of the foreign born 
in the United States based upon the I89O census.16 The 
Rogers Act, which reorganized the Foreign Service, and the 
child labor amendment, which authorized the Congress to regu­
late the labor of persons under 18 years, were the other
l^New York Times, November 29, 192^, pp. 1-2.
15The bill is analyzed in Roy G. Blakey, "The Revenue 
Act of 192L," American Economic Review, XIV (September, 
192M, 7^5-50^ .
16John Higham, Strangers in the Land; Patterns of 
American Nativism 1860-1925 (New Brunswick; Rutgers Univer­
sity Press, 1955)’, pp. 2^-330, is a critical source for 
immigration policy in the 1920*s.
important measures passed by the Senate• In the second 
session, the Senate approved a plethora of minor bills.-*-?
The alliance between the Democrats and unreliable 
Republicans was nearly defunct in the first session of the 
69th Congressc This may have been because the increased 
number of reliable Republicans impaired the alliance*s 
effectiveness, but the surface impression was that the Demo­
crats and unreliable Republicans simply lacked the will to 
use their power.-*-® There seemed to be three causes behind 
this lack of will, including a "new" Democratic attitude, a 
paucity of divisive issues, and an improvement in relations 
between the reliable and unreliable Republicans, The Demo­
crats reflected an inexplicable disinterest in a working 
alliance with the dissident Republicans, As an example, only 
a few Democrats responded when George W. Norris (R-Neb.) 
implored the loyal opposition to support his amendment to 
the revenue bill.19 Cooperation between the two groups, how­
ever, appeared to increase during the second session. Second
l?For a survey of the legislation enacted in the 68th 
Congress see Rogers, American Political Science Review, XIX, 
No. A, 766; and Lindsay Rogers and Parker Thomas Moon (ed„), 
"Record of Political Events," Political Science Quarterly,
XLI (March, 1926), ^0~7*K
-^Arthur W. Macmahon, '"American Government and Politics 
First Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress: December 7» 1925» 
to July 3, 1926," American Political Science Review, XX (Augu
1926), 612,
-*-9u,S.f Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1926, LXVII, Part 3605. * Hereafter cited as Cong. Record,.
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many crucial issues had been resolved by the 69th Congress 
which reduced the need for Democratic and unreliable Repub­
lican unity. The primary basis of their alliance was 
obstruction or modification of the regular Republican pro­
gram. With most of this program already enacted, there was 
less impetus for the two groups to continue their working 
relationship. Neither group advanced an original legisla­
tive program which could have revitalized their pact.
Finally, there was a beginning of reconciliation 
between the Republican factions. There was intense 
agitation between Republicans at the first of the 69th 
Congress, which abated only upon its conclusion. A vicious 
party division occurred when the reliables punished the 
defectors in the 192^ presidential election. Ladd and 
La Follette had died, which left Frazier and Brookhart to 
be disciplined. Following extensive debate, Robert N. 
Stanfield (Ore.) supplanted Frazier as chairman of the 
Committee on Public Lands and Surveys by a 36-13 margin 
in an almost exclusively Republican election.20 a dis­
puted Iowa election gave the most adamant Republican regu­
lars their opportunity for revenge upon Brookhart. In the 
Senate vote to determine possession of the contested seat, 
one-third of the reliable Republicans voted with the
20Ibid., 69th Cong., Special Sess., 1925, LXVII, 
Part 1, z r r
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Democrats to seat Democrat Daniel F. Steck-in place of 
Brookhart, The vote was 45-^1.^1
There was also a dissident-reliable Republican 
struggle over the appointment of Gerald P. Nye (N.D.) to fill 
the vacant seat resulting from Ladd’s death. The constitu­
tional issue was whether the appointment fulfilled the 
requirements of the 17th Amendment: the political issue was 
that Nye was appointed by a governor elected with the Non- 
Partisan League’s endorsement. The Senate Committee on 
Privileges and Elections made an adverse report concerning 
Nye's eligibility, but a Democratic majority and one-third 
of the Republicans voted to seat the North Dakotan.^2
Nevertheless, there was a germ of improved relations 
between the two Republican wings. Robert M. La Follette, Jr. 
(Wis.), upon election to his father's former seat, expressed 
an allegiance to the father's progressive ideals and policies. 
Although the La Follette manifesto portended rebellion, the 
Republican caucus chose to regard him as a regular Republican 
party member.23 La Follette gladly accepted the designation.
21ibid., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part 7, 
7301. Also see Clarence A. Berdahl, "American Government 
and Politics: Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress,
II," American Political Science Review, XLIII (June, 19^9)» 
4-92- 9^
22cong. Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII,
Part 2, 1893.
23l4acmahon, American Political Science Review, XX,
No. 3» 613.
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Then in the second session, perhaps-influenced by 
the election results which would narrow the Republican mar­
gin in the new Senate, the regulars made a basic retreat 
with respect to the remaining 1924 bolter. Frazier was 
readmitted to the Republican conference and his committee 
seniority was restored. ^  Relations between the two fac­
tions would improve drastically in the 70th Congress.
There were few legislative achievements in the 69th 
Congress. More Senate attention than usual was given to 
foreign affairs, including an intense struggle between iso­
lationist and internationalist groups over the World Court 
Resolution and consideration of many minor treaties. The 
1926 Revenue Act was perhaps the most important domestic 
bill passed by the Senate. Secretary Mellon's tenacity was 
rewarded when the senators finally accepted the bulk of 
his plan, including a reduction in corporate taxes.25
A much publicized bill in the first session was the Me 
Nary-Haugen measure based upon the scheme formulated by George 
N. Peek, President of the Moline Plow C o m p a n y . T h e r e  was
^Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Poli­
tics: Second Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress: December 6 , 
1926, to March 4, 1927," American Political Science Review,
XXI (May, 1927), 298.
25The law is analyzed in Roy G. Blakey, "Revenue Act 
of 1926," American Economic Review, XVI (September, 1926),
401-25.
2 6 Two valuable sources on McNary-Haugen are Gilbert C. 
Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman:
2^
profuse debate over the bill which failed to receive Senate 
approval because of Democratic and Eastern Republican opposi­
tion. The farm forces, however, did not accept this defeat 
as final.
The McNary-Haugen plan and the banking bill, which 
related to branch banking and federal reserve bank charters, 
nearly constituted the total business of the second session. 
Both bills could be passed if they could be brought to the 
Senate floor. The McNary-Haugen bill was certain of passage 
because it had been rewritten to attract Southern votes. A 
dispute over priority developed between the supporters of each 
measure. The impasse was resolved when the Senate approved 
the motion to make the farm bill unfinished business, and the 
banking bill advocates agreed to limit debate on McNary-Haugen 
in order to gain support for their bill from farm bill 
supporters. This manipulation enabled the passage of the two 
most important bills in the second s e s s i o n . ^7
With the narrow Republican margin in the 70th Congress, 
a crisis in the organization of the Senate was to be expected. 
The Senate, however, was organized with little friction.
The realistic regular Republicans increased Democratic
University of Oklahoma Press, 195^) and; John D. Black, 
"McNary-Haugen Movement," American Economic Review, XVIII 
(September, 1928), ^05-27.
27i4acmahon, American Political Science Review, XXI,
No. 2, 306-08.
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representation on the standing committees. Then the regulars 
acquiesced in the elevation of dissident Republicans to 
committee chairmanships. With Gerald P. Nye (N.D.), Lynn J. 
Frazier (N.D.), Peter Norbeck (S.D.), and Robert B. Howell 
(Neb.) made chairmen, this left only the Committee on 
Privileges and Elections under regular Republican control, 
and it was forced to share power with the special committee 
on elections,^8
Dissident and regular Republicans denied that they 
had made a formal bargain in order to expedite Senate 
organization. When the correspondence between Charles 
Curtis (Kan.), Republican Senate majority leader, and the 
La Follette group was made public, however, it contained 
certain requirements of a bargain. Prior to the convening 
of the 70th Congress, La Follette and his followers informed 
Curtis that committee preferment was not their basic con­
cern, but they want assurances from the Republican majority 
that there would be votes in the first session on the McNary- 
Haugen bill, an investigation of United States Latin Ameri­
can policy, and the bill to regulate issuance of injunc­
tions. 29 Curtis responded that votes were due on the
28Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Poli­
tics; First Session of the Seventieth Congress; December 5* 
1927, to May 29, 1928," American Political Science Review, 
XXII (August, 1928), 653.
29cong. Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1927» LXiX, 
Part 1, 537*
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measures, and that the promotion.of unreliable Republicans 
to chairmanships of committees would ensure that the bills 
would not be p i g e o n h o l e d , 30 The reply was unsatisfactory 
to the La Follette group who now insisted that their posi­
tion be made known to the Republican conference. The con­
ference authorized Curtis to negotiate with the unreliables; 
the result was a press statement which defined their under­
standing, A pledge was made by the Republican conference 
that there would be no delay on the votes wanted by the La 
Follette group. In return, the La Follette group promised 
to assist in the Republican organization of the Senate, but 
reserved their right to an independent course thereafter.31 
Once the Senate was organized, it considered charges 
of excessive campaign expenditures and fraud against Repub­
lican Senators-elect Frank L, Smith (111,) and William Vare 
(Penn.), Vare was prevented from taking his seat during the 
70th Congress while an investigation was made of the charges 
against him. By a 61-23 vote, Smith was declared ineligible 
for the Illinois seat,32 The Senate leadership then concen­
trated upon their legislative program, Among the major bills
30Kansas Historical Society, Charles Curtis MSS,
Curtis to Senators La Follette, Frazier, Nye, John J, Blaine 
(R-Wis.), and Henrik Shipstead (FL-Minne.), Dec. 3, 1927.
31Cong. Record, 70th Cong,, 1st Sess., 1927» LXIX,
Part 1, 537
3 2 i b i d . , p .  1 7 8 .
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passed by the Senate were the tax reduction bill, the 
McNary-Haugen measure, a bill to enable the manufacture of 
fertilizer in the Muscle Shoals plant, and a flood control 
measure. 33
The Senate leadership's legislative program was 
enacted in the first session, except for the Boulder Dam and 
Navy Cruiser bills. These measures, along with the Kellogg- 
Briand Treaty, were given priority in the second session. 
Senate passage of the Boulder Dam bill terminated years of 
bitter stalemate between the Southwestern states over water 
.resources. A conflict then developed as to whether the Navy 
Cruiser bill or the Kellogg-Briand Treaty should receive 
priority. The supporters of each proposal agreed to make 
both items unfinished business, and the two measures were tied 
together and passed.
This chapter basically supports the traditional theme 
that Senate activity resulted in few positive legislative 
accomplishments and was characterized by intense intraparty 
discord. Dissension is usually present in a deliberative 
body, but the chronic and pervasive tension in the 1920*s
33ihe principal bills are summarized in Macmahon, 
American Political Science Review, XXII, No. 3» 669-75•
34The major legislative achievements of the second 
session are found in Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government 
and Politics: Second Session of the Seventieth Congress: 
December 3, 1928, to March 1929»" American Political 
Science Review, XXIII (May, 1929), 365^2.
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seems to exceed what is normal. This is a correct impression 
but it is often overstated. The usual emphasis upon internal 
party controversy and political irregularity can be attributed 
both to the historian's frame of reference and methodology, 
and to the topic. The historian often focuses upon diver­
gence from the standard pattern; this sometimes causes him to 
neglect the general scheme and exaggerate deviation. Then 
too, the use of traditional research methods encourages the 
historian to concentrate upon aspects which receive the most 
publicity regardless of whether those aspects are representa­
tive. The American political system itself compounds the 
difficulty in adopting the proper perspective toward irregu­
larity. It is an unusually stable system responsible for 
an atmosphere in which any political rebellion may give the 
impression of proportions that it does not have. This was 
true in the 1920*s. The following chapters emphasize what 
the general trend was in Senate voting. Irregularity was 
prominent in the decade, but this should not cause neglect 
of the basic political pattern. The subsequent chapters 
attempt to restore a more balanced perspective to party 
politics in the 1920's.
CHAPTER II
A MEASUREMENT OF DIVISION AND LIKENESS 
BETWEEN THE REPUBLICAN AND 
DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
The two major interpretations of politics in the 
1920's indicate that party affiliation was less forceful 
than normal in determining Senate voting alignments. Whereas 
party membership is traditionally the paramount guide to the 
way legislators vote, it is commonly asserted that other 
loyalties and interests distracted from and sometimes 
supplanted party allegiance in this era. One standard thesis 
emphasizes the salient ideological and sectional fissures 
within both political parties. Western and Midwestern Repub­
lican senators, who held progressive views and represented 
agriculture, opposed their Eastern colleagues, who advanced 
business policies and were political conservatives. The 
Democratic party was divided into urban and rural wings and 
each regarded the other as an anathema.-*- These divisions 
discouraged voting along strict party lines. If this descrip­
tion is accurate, vote analysis should reveal few instances 
of unified parties confronting each other.
3-For a general statement of this theme see John D. 
Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 (New Yorks Harper 
and Row^ 198077” 88-105.
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The other interpretation emphasizes.the homogeneity 
of the two political parties. With the eclipse of progres- 
sivism, the contention is that the national government was 
dominated by preponderant conservative majorities in both 
parties.2 The conclusion is that ideological affinity 
between Republicans and Democrats resulted in the two groups 
voting more alike than usual. Therefore, voting patterns 
should reflect slight division between the parties. From 
another perspective, this thesis reenforces the premise 
that party membership declined as an influence on voting 
behavior because party exclusiveness was made secondary to 
ideology. This impeded voting alignments along party lines. 
Accordingly, an examination of the votes should indicate 
exceptionally unified parties voting in unusually high 
agreement with each other.
Both of the preceding generalizations about party 
politics have some validity, but they are not wholly accept­
able, They seem to have impressionistic bases. This stems 
from the failure both to define terms or apply the proper 
methodology. The result is that there is only a vague idea 
of what is being measured and the measurement itself is in­
exact. Precise political descriptions require the use of meth­
ods designed for the nature of the inquiry. It is virtually
^Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny: A History 
of Modern American Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1952"), 28^-319» contains a firm position on conservative 
control of the parties.
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impossible to measure accurately division and affinity 
between the parties without the use of simple statistical 
methodology. This technique is used in this chapter. The 
results are analyzed for patterns that will supplement and 
modify the standard historical interpretations.
A common assertion is that national politics in the 
1920®s were abnormal. In reality, however, there is no normal 
political era with which the 1920's can be contrasted. There 
are, nevertheless, general contours in American politics, and 
most historians believe that the "twenties" diverged enough 
from the pattern to be an aberration. This judgment can only 
be tested through a comparison of the results from this inves­
tigation with other voting studies. The comparison is made 
in this chapter, but the conclusions must be somewhat quali­
fied because there are differences in techniques between the 
studies.
One premise to be tested in this chapter is that party 
affiliation was less influencial in determining senators' 
voting positions than normally. There should, therefore, be 
few votes reflecting high party unity with the parties voting 
solidly against each other. The "party vote" is a simple 
method to measure high party unity and extreme division 
between the Republicans and Democrats. By the standard applied 
here, at least 90 per cent of the members of each party must 
vote against each other to be a party vote. So determined,
32
there were 79 party votes in the .1920*s, which is only 5.8 
per cent of the total 1364 roll-call votes. This percentage 
is statistically unimpressive and substantially below the 
number in other eras for which there is information. A, 
Lawrence Lowell, an early researcher in the study of party 
influence on legislative voting, compiled and summarized 
data on 1644 Senate votes in five Congresses during the 
nineteenth century.3 Using the same standards as above, an 
examination of these votes revealed that 401, or 24.4 per 
cent, were party votes.^
Again using a vote of 90 per cent as the gauge,
but now with this percentage or more of the two parties
voting in agreement, there is little difference in 
the results from this and the Lowell investigation. At 
least 90 per cent of both parties voted together only 20 
times or on 1.2 per cent of the votes in the nineteenth 
century Congresses.5 This is slightly less than the 
1920*s when 90 per cent of each party voted the same
way 29 times or on 2,1 per cent of the roll-call
3a . Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon 
Legislation in England and America," Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year 1901 (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), I, 319-
542. The data is for the 29th, 38th, 50th, 55th, and 58th 





votes. This data appears to support the conclusion that 
party was less decisive in determining voting behavior during 
the 1920's. A thorough comparison between this and the 
Lowell study, however, suggests that this conclusion is only 
partially true. Although there were fewer party votes in 
the Senate during the 1920's, party division was reflected 
in a larger percentage of votes than in the nineteenth century 
Congresses.
Both sets of data were examined to ascertain also the 
number of times that 90 per cent or more of one party voted 
in opposition to at least 50 per cent but less than 90 per 
cent of the other party. In the 1920's, this was the pattern 
on ^56 or 33.^ per cent of the votes. Parenthetically, the 
same party percentages voted in agreement on only 7.5 per 
cent or 102 of the votes. By this formula, there was more 
disagreement between the parties in the twentieth than the 
nineteenth century Congresses. In the latter period, the 
above pattern of disagreement occurred 535 times or upon 
32.5 per cent of the votes. On 11.9 per cent or 195 votes, 
the same party percentages voted alike.^
Majorities, but less than 90 per cent, of each party 
voted in opposition on the remaining votes. There were ^93 
votes in the nineteenth century Congresses on which the
6Ibid.
3^
majorities voted against each other which translates into 30 
per cent of the total votes.7 In marked contrast, the 
Republican and Democratic majorities, between 1921 and 1929» 
voted in opposition on 51*2 per cent of the votes or 698 
times.
These statistics seem to confirm that party affiliation 
was the principal guide to the way senators voted both in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century Congresses. Division between 
the parties is indicated on 86.9 per cent of the votes in the 
former and on 90.^ per cent in the latter Congresses, An 
unexpected conclusion is that party affiliation was a signi­
ficant factor on a greater percentage of votes in the 1920*s. 
The paucity of party votes in the 67th through the 70th 
Congress, however, suggests that few issues generated enough 
partisanship to produce many votes with extraordinary party 
majorities voting against each other. Another basic deduction 
is that, although the bulk of senators must have voted their 
party position, either the Republicans or Democrats or both 
were more fragmented than normal.
The "index of likeness" is another technique for 
measuring the difference between Republicans and Democrats.
It measures the difference between the two groups in the 
degree of support given to a motion. The index is obtained
7Ibid.
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by subtracting the percentage of -"yea" votes cast by one 
party from the percentage of "yea" votes cast by the other, 
and subtracting the difference from 100. Therefore, if the 
Republicans support a measure 70 "yea" and 30 "nay", and the 
Democrats oppose it 70 "nay" and 30 "yea," the Republican 
percentage of "yea" votes is 70, and the Democratic 30. The 
difference between these percentages is ^0, which, when sub­
tracted from 100 yields an index of likeness of 60. The 
index of likeness ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 representing 
complete dissimilarity of voting behavior, and 100 perfect 
similarity.8
There was 61.3 average likeness between the Republi­
cans and Democrats for the 67th through the 70th Congress.
This likeness percentage only slightly exceeded the normal 
interparty likeness over a protracted period. From the ^7th 
through the 76th Congress . (1880-19^-0), the average likeness 
between the parties was 59*7*9 The average likeness for the 
1920's acquires more significance when it is examined by 
Congress and issue.
®Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, pp. 209-11.
9This likeness percentage was computed from materials 
in John B. Johnson, Jr., The Extent and Consistency of Party 
Voting in the United States Senate (unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, University of Chicago^ 19^3)» 22-251. Although data 
from the Johnson study enables valuable comparisons, conclu­
sions from comparisons between this and the Johnson investiga­
tion must be qualified. This is because there are basic 
differences in chronology and organization between the two
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Increasing likeness between the Republicans and Demo­
crats was the trend throughout the decade. They had the 
least mutuality in the 6?th Congress (1921-23) with only 
likeness. Thereafter, their likeness drastically 
increased. Republican and Democratic likeness rose to 
62.0, then 66,0, and finally 68.0 for the 68th (1923-25),
69th (1925-27), and the 70th (1927-29) Congresses.
There vras a salient divergence of interparty like­
ness according to issues. In the following table, Republi­
can and Democratic likeness is presented for all 20 
categories of issues. The table includes their likeness 
for each category by Congress with the average likeness for 
the decade. There is a 60.5 variance between the issue with 
the least and most interparty likeness. It is apparent that 
any discerning judgment with respect to interparty likeness 
must make reference to specific issuese Historical generali­
zations which imply uniform interparty likeness are 
deceptive and inaccurate.
The assertion that Republicans and Democrats had more 
affinity upon specific issues than normal can now be tested.
A table was constructed in which the interparty likeness on
studies 0 The Johnson dissertation analyzes 2^3 representa­
tive votes over several epochs whereas this study includes 
all roll-call for one historical era.
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TABLE 2
INTERPARTY LIKENESS BY ISSUE AND 
CONGRESS, 1921-1929
Issue Congress Average Likeness
67 68 69 70
Tariff 29.0 24,0 32.0 28.3
Race 8.0 28.0 54.0 30.0
Senate Organization 29.0 20.0 51.0 35.0 33.8
Appropriations 37.0 49.0 42.0 69.0 49.3
Tax Revenue 34.0 52.0 67.0 46.0 49.8
Investigations 38.0 67.0 54.0 42.0 50.3
Pensions-Claims-
Compensation 58.0 58.0
Business-Industry-Banks 40.0 53.0 69.O 74.0 59.0
Senate Procedure 36.0 56.0 66.0 85.0 60.8
Veterans' Compensation 77.0 51.0 65.0 64.3
Public Works 36.0 77.0 69.O 80.0 65.5
Agriculture 58.0 59.0 70.0 80.0 66 • 8
Government Organization 46.0 79.0 75.0 74.0 68.5
Appointments 50.0 74.0 57.0 99.0 70.0
Military Affairs 57.0 75.0 65.O 83.0 70.3
Public Power 76.0 81.0 67.0 71.3
Foreign Policy 45.0 86.0 86.0 83.O 75.0
Welfare 88.0 67.O 74.0 76.3
Immigration 72.0 83.0 91.0 82.0
Prohibition 94.0 87.0 85.O 88.7
certain issues during the 1920*s was compared with the same 
issues from 1880 through 1940.^0 There are two admitted 
flaws in this comparison: (1) some major issues were excluded 
from comparison because they were not analyzed in the John­
son study; and (2) specific legislation incorporated within 
a general category of issues may not always be identical in 
both studies. Despite these deficiencies, the preceding
10The information for 1880-1940 was extrapolated and 
computed from Johnson, pp. 22-251#
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF INTERPARTY LIKENESS IN THE 1920"S WITH THE AVERAGE 












Tariff 28.3 23.6 4.7
Tax-Revenue 49.8 57.9 8.1
Business-Industry-Banks 59.0 66.2 7.2
Veterans* Compensation 64.3 79.2 14.9
Agriculture 66.8 59.7 7.1
Foreign Policy 75.0 52.0 23.0
Welfare 76.3 74.3 2.0
Immigration 82.0 81.0 1.0




comparison provides a basis for correctives, or perhaps 
refinements, in political interpretations of the 1920's. 
Although there was more Republican and Democratic likeness 
on issues by overall averages, this generalization will not 
hold up when applied to specific issues. Party differences 
on tax-revenue, business-industry-banks, and veterans* 
compensation, three of the nine issues, were markedly more 
pronounced in the 1920’s than normal. On two issues, wel­
fare and immigration, there was slightly more interparty 
likeness than usual, but the difference between the 1920's 
and the 1880-19^0 average is inappreciable. The remaining 
four issues, tariff, agriculture, foreign policy, and 
prohibition (liquor), reflect a significant increase in 
affinity between the two parties. For accuracy and effica- 
city, historical generalizations on interparty likeness 
must be qualified according to issues.
The traditional historical descriptions of the extent 
of interparty likeness and division during the 1920's are 
substantially valid, but require some modification. Divi­
sions between the Republicans and Democrats in the 1920*s 
were not as intense but were more frequent than normal. 
Although partisanship failed to produce average divisions of 
intensity between the parties, indicating that party member­
ship was less influencial on the voting behavior of some 
senators, the significant conclusion is that the fundamental 
Senate divisions continued to be along party lines. There
was more voting homogeneity between Republicans and Demo­
crats than was usual, but only slightly more than the 
normal likeness pattern. The traditional interpretation 
required other modifications. The two groups did not vote 
more alike than was usual throughout the era: they voted 
less alike at the beginning of the decade than was normal 
but by its conclusion their mutuality exceeded the "norm." 
Their degree of likeness was also contingent upon issue. 
Statements with respect to interparty mutuality must make 
allowance for these relevancies. Partisanship declined 
slightly in the 1920*s, but party remained the basic 
influence upon voting behavior.
CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC AND 
REPUBLICAN PARTY COHESION
This chapter is an analysis of Republican and 
Democratic party solidarity during the 1920's. According 
to the usual interpretation, both political parties were 
afflicted with deep ideological and sectional divisions.
The schism in the Republican party aligned the progressive- 
agrarian Western and Midwestern senators against the con­
servative-urban Easterners, There was a power struggle of 
equal intensity and scope within the Democratic party. The 
rural, dry, nativist, protestant forces clashed with the 
urban, Catholic, wet, immigrant wing. Intraparty relations 
were characterized by recrimination and sharp divisions. •*• 
The natural result was a substantial reduction in party 
unity.
iThis description may be slightly oversimplified, but 
it is the basic theme advanced, among others, by Wilfred E. 
Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History, 
4th ed. enl. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*62); Russel B.
Nye» Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Study of Its Origins 
and Development, 1870-1956 (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1959T; Malcolm Moos, The Republicans : A 
History of Their Party (New York: Random House, 1956T;
William E. Leuchenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); George H.
Mayer, The Republican Party_, 1854-1954 (New York: Oxford
University Pres's7~19^4y» Arthur S. Link, William B. Cat ton, 
and William M. Leary, Jr,, American Epoch: A History of the 
United States Since the 1890's, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, I967TT and Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933.
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This nearly categorical assertion of party fragmen­
tation has not previously been examined by vote analysis.
Even if the standard interpretation is basically correct, 
this does not obviate the need for more precise measurement 
of party fragmentation. There is likewise a need for inves­
tigation of heretofore neglected aspects and ramifications 
of party solidarity in the 1920's, This chapter attempts to 
rectify these deficiencies in the traditional interpretations.
A simple and effective method by which to assess 
party unity is by a graph which indicates the number of times 
that various percentages of party members vote together. 
Democratic solidarity is first examined in the following 
table. It includes all the roll-call votes in the 6?th 
through the 70th Congress. The number of times that the 
indicated percentages of Democrats vote together are pre­
sented by Congress with totals for the 1920's. Within the 
parentheses, the number of votes are presented as a percentage 
of the total votes in each Congress. The obvious impression 
is that of pronounced Democratic solidarity. At least 90 
per cent of the Democrats voted together on nearly one-half 
of the total votes during the 1920's. In the descending 
scale of Democratic unity there are progressively fewer 
votes. The table also indicates that there was significant 
variance in Democratic solidarity from Congress to Congress, 
and that there was a pattern of declining cohesion throughout 
the decade.
TABLE 4
NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF THE 










67 49 (6.7) 62 (8.5) 98(13.5 ) 136(18.7) 382(52.5) 727
68 28(13.1) 23(10.8 ) 25(11.7) 38(17.8) 99(46.5) 213
69 32(13.7) 33(14.1) 49(20.9) 45(19.2) 75(32.1) 234
70 33(17.4) 27(14.2) 34(17.9) 30(15.8) 66(34.7) 190
Totals 142(10.4) 14-5(10.6) 206(15.1) 249(18.3) 622(45.6) 1364
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The frequency that certain percentages of Democrats 
voted together was also determined according to issue. This 
computation revealed that Democratic cohesion fluctuated 
graphically contingent upon the issues.
Table 4 and Table 5 demonstrate that Democratic unity 
was dependent upon the issue and relative according to the 
Congress. These tables provide a valuable general impres­
sion of Democratic solidarity, but they fail to measure 
party affinity with satisfactory precision. This can be 
rectified through the use of the cohesion index. The index 
.of cohesion is a measure of party unity on a vote, regard­
less of the position of the other party. It is obtained by 
dividing the number of votes cast by the party members who 
were in a majority by the total number of party members who 
voted. The percentage will range from 50 to 100, and is 
converted to the scale of 0 to 100. Therefore, if the party 
votes either 25 "yea" and 75 "nay" or 75 "yea" and 25 "nay," 
the majority cast 75 votes which are divided by 100, the 
total number of votes cast. The percentage is 75» which 
converted to a 0 to 100 scale equals 50, the party's index 
of cohesion. The lowest cohesion is 0, and the highest is 
100.2
Democratic cohesion was 61.8 in the 1920's. This is 
less than normal Democratic cohesion. Their average cohesion,
^Rice, Quantitive Methods in Politics, pp. 208-9*
TABLE 5
NUMBER OP TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF THE DEMOCRATS VOTE 
TOGETHER ACCORDING TO ISSUES, 1921-29
Issue Percentage of Democrats Voting Together Total
50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Senate
Organization 1 0 2 3 53 59
Foreign Affairs 17 20 23 27 51 138
Military Affairs 8 13 13 14 19 67
Tariff 12 10 29 55 212 318
Senate Procedure 14 14 13 8 36 85
Appointments 2 3 2 10 19 36
Government
Organization 7 3 16 18 15 59
Immigration 3 5 4 4 3 19
Agriculture 12 18 22 28 16 96
Welfare 7 3 10 4 0 24
Business-Industry-
61Banks 8 10 11 10 22
'Tax-Revenue 13 12 14 21 79 139
Veterans *
Compensation 1 2 7 7 13 30
Prohibition 3 4 5 3 1 16
Appropriations 8 7 13 19 40 87
Pensions-Claims-
4Compensation 1 2 1 0 0
Public Works 4 10 5 5 10 34
Public Power 20 8 14 10 4 56
Investigations 0 0 2 1 28 31
Race 1 1 0 2 1 5
Totals 142 145 206 249 622 1364
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based upon 243 votes encompassing ten,issues, from 1880 
through 1940 was 69.8 which is 8,0 more than it was for the 
1920's,3 This comparison verifies the usual historical 
interpretations with respect to increased Democratic dis­
unity, When the average cohesion for the 1920's is analyzed 
by Congress and issue, there are ramifications which are not 
reflected in the standard theses.
Democratic solidarity varied significantly dependent 
upon the Congress, In the 67th Congress, Democrats had an 
impressive 69.0 cohesion which was the most they had in any 
"twenties" Congress, There was a consistent waning of their 
solidarity in each succeeding Congress, Democratic cohesion 
declined to 65.0, then to 57»0» and finally to 56.0 in the 
68th, 69th, and 70th Congresses. Corresponding, and 
apparently related, to decreasing Democratic unity were 
changes in Senate issues and party membership, and party 
quarrels outside the Congress, The enactment of many Repub­
lican programs in the 67th Congress seems to have eroded 
Democratic solidarity. Also, from a nearly exclusive 
Southern group, the Senate Democratic party became 
increasing heterogeneous which contributed to disunity.
The extent to which this variegated party composition 
caused less voting solidarity is difficult to assess.
A few Southerners especially, however, demonstrated
3This figure is based upon data from Johnson, pp. 22-
251.
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some voting irregularity. Relations, outside the Senate,
«
between the urban and rural Democratic wings did degenerate 
throughout the era culminating in Southern indifference and 
even defection in the 1928 presidential election.
Democratic cohesion also varied appreciably upon the 
nature of the issue. In the following table, the Democrats' 
cohesion is given by issue for each Congress with the average 
cohesion for all Congresses in the 1920's. Although Demo­
cratic cohesion exceeded their historical "norm" for some 
issues in an isolated Congress, primarily the 67th, this 
was not the general pattern for the decade. Democratic 
cohesion, with the exception of the tariff, was less in the 
1920's than their overall average on every issue, for which 
there is data to enable comparisons. When the results from 
this analysis are contrasted with the average Democratic 
cohesion between 1880 and 1940, the high degree of Democratic 
disunity in the 1920's becomes obvious.^
In table 7, Democratic solidarity for the 1920's is 
compared with their normal cohesion between 1880-1940 on 
certain issues. The issues are arranged in the sequence 
from least to most cohesion during the 1920's. Whether 
Democratic cohesion was more or less in the 1920's is 
indicated in the appropriate column.
4The raw data for the 1880-1940 average cohesion Is 
found in Johnson, pp. 22-251.
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TABLE 6
DEMOCRATIC COHESION ACCORDING TO ISSUE FOR 
EACH CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE 
COHESION FOR THE 67TH THROUGH 
THE 70TH CONGRESS,
1921-29
Issue Congress Average Cohesion
67 68 69 70
Pensions-Claims-
Compensation 27.0 - - - - 27.0
Public Power 35.0 31.0 46.0 37.3
Prohibition 30.0 - - 55.0 32.0 39.0
Welfare 59.0 15.0 44.0 39.3
Immigration 58.0 52.0 8.0 - - 39.3
Agriculture 56.0 33.0 52.0 48,0 47.3
Senate Procedure 65.0 55.0 52.0 26.0 ^9.5
Race 88.0 55.0 — 8.0 50.3
Foreign Policy 57.0 4-8.0 67.0 53.0 56.3
Military Affairs 53.0 4-3.0 7 0.0 60.0 56.5
Public Works 81.0 58.0 45.0 48,0 58.0
Government
Organization 60.0 58.0 72.0 48.0 59.5
Bus ines s-Industry-
46.0 62.8Banks 63.0 89.0 53.0
Appropriations 69.0 72.0 55.0 58.0 63.5
Appointments 70.0 80.0 66.0 58.0 68.5
Veterans *
84.0Compensation 55.0 71.0 — 70.0
Tax-Revenue 80.0 82.0 55.0 65.O 70.5
Tariff 76.0 74.0 86.0 7 8.7
Senate
84.8Organization 93.0 95.0 66.0 85.0
Inve s t i gat i ons 88.0 100.0 91.0 9 6.0 93.8
These statistical indices demonstrate that party
affiliation was less instrumental in determining senators' 
voting behavior in the 1920's than normally. It should not 
be concluded, however, that party affiliation was a negli­
gible influence upon voting patterns. Subsequent analysis
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TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC COHESION IN THE 
1920'S WITH THEIR AVERAGE COHESION 







Prohibition (liquor) 39.0 A7.8 8.8
Welfare 39.3 76.0 36.7
Immigration 39.3 68.3 29.0
Agriculture A7.3 6A, 8 17 0 5
Foreign Policy 56.3 63. A 7.1
Business-Industry-Banks 62.8 68.5 5.7
Veterans' Compensation 7 0.0 . 79.9 9.9
Tax-Revenue 70.5 73.3 2.8
Tariff 78.7 76.7 2.0
will reenforce the conclusion that party membership was the
most discernible influence upon Senate voting in all 
Congresses and for every issue.
If party affiliation was irrelevant to the way Demo­
crats voted, their voting profile would reflect a "chance" 
pattern. In the absence of party pressure, one-half of the 
Democrats would be expected to vote one way and one-half the 
other way, and the influence of party would be 0. Chi- 
squares indicate the effect of a variable in the vote distri­
bution, which is party in this case. The larger the chi- 
square statistic, the stronger is the relatedness in the 
sample.-5 The chi-square test indicates there was a party
5For a description and formula of chi-square see 
George H. Weinberg and John A. Schumaker, Statistics; An
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influence upon Democratic voting. Democratic chi-squares 
were 7*^9 » 8.21, 6.97 and. 7.78 for the 67th, 68th, 69th and 
70th Congresses. Chi-square analysis also revealed a party 
influence upon voting over all issues.^ The usual historical 
pronouncements on the existence of extreme Democratic dis­
unity in the 1920® s are supported, by statistical evidence. 
These pronouncements are, however, exceedingly imprecise. 
Democratic cohesion was closely related to time sequence and 
issues; historical generalizations which fail to allow for 
these factors are inaccurate.
Republican and Democratic patterns of disunity are 
in sharp contrast. Although the statistical information 
reenforces the interpretation that there was "inordinate" 
disruption within the Republican party, the analysis pro­
duced unexpected results. The Republicans were less united 
than the Democrats in most of the Congresses. They were 
also more fragmented relative to their overall "norm" of 
party cohesion than the Democrats. Republican cohesion was 
57,8 for the decade. This was 9.8 below the average 
Republican cohesion of 67*6 between 1880-19^0.^ These
Intuitive Accroach (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publish­
ing Company, 1962T, 216-2^.
^Democratic chi-squares for Congresses and issues 
are in Appendix A.
7This statistic was computed from data found in 
Johnson, pp. 22-251*
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measurements seem to emphatically confirm the presence of 
usually high divisions between the Republicans during the 
1920*8.
Upon examination, however, there were diverse motifs 
within the major theme of Republican discord. This is easily 
perceived in the graph with vote distribution by the percent­
age of Republicans voting together. Although Republican 
solidarity in the 1920's was below their average, the table 
suggests that they had more unity than allowed for in the 
usual interpretation. At least 90 per cent of the Republi­
cans voted together on over two-fifths of the total votes, 
and 80 per cent or more of the Republicans were in agree­
ment on over three-fifths of the votes in the 1920's. The 
table also indicates that Republican solidarity had divergent 
patterns over the decade.
The decline in Republican unity in the 1920's is 
reflected in the cohesion indices. In the 67th Congress 
(1921-23)» Republican cohesion was 71.0 which was the most 
for either party in any Congress in the 1920's. This was 
unexpected because more substantive and, theoretically, 
divisive issues were raised in the 67th Congress. The 
natural assumption would be, based upon the interpretation of 
internal ideological and geographical party conflict, that 
Republican cohesion would be less in this Congress. After 
the 67th Congress, there was a precipitous decline in party
TABLE 8











67 52 (7.2) 56 (7.7) 83(11.4) 136(18.7) 400(55.0) 727
68 21 (9.9) 32(15.0) 50(23.5) 46(21.6) 64(30.0) 213
69 29(12.4) 42(17.9) 54(23.1) 61(26.1 ) 48(20.5) 234
70 27(14.2) 54(28.4) 33(17.4) 32(16.8 ) 44(23.2) 190
Totals 129 (9.5) 184(13.5) 220(16.1 ) 275(20.2 ) 556(40.8) 1364
ro
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unity. The entry of "farm state radicals"'into the Senate 
following the 1922 elections certainly contributed to the 
breach within the party. It was widened with the Republican 
rupture in the 192^ presidential election. Republican 
cohesion fell to 57*0 in the 68th Congress (1923-25). 
Intraparty relations improved after the 68th Congress and 
by 1927 most of the outstanding differences between the 
groups were resolved. Incongruously, the restoration of 
party relations was paralleled with a constant decrease in 
party voting solidarity. Republican cohesion declined to 
53.0 in the 69th Congress (1925-27)# and finally to 50.0 in 
the 70th Congress (1927-29)* Surface impressions of party 
unity may not always correspond to voting cohesion.
Perhaps an insight into the nature and cause of 
Republican discord can be obtained from examining their 
voting patterns according to issues. The following table 
presents the percentages of Republicans voting together 
according to issues. The cohesion index reenforces the 
impression from the vote distribution scale that there was 
extreme divergence among Republicans contingent upon the 
issue. There was 55*3 difference between the issue upon 
which there was the least and most Republican cohesion. This 
range was less than that of the Democrats, but it exceeded 
by far the normal Republican range.
5^
TABLE 9
NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF 




50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Total
Senate
Organization 2 8 19 11 19 59
Foreign Policy 4 5 19 21 89 138
Military Affairs 9 11 18 16 13 67
Tariff 21 18 30 46 203 318
Senate Procedure 8 7 10 13 47 85
Appointments 1 3 8 10 14 36
Government
Organization 6 7 8 16 22 59
Immigration 3 3 1 3 9 19
Agriculture 20 13 25 24 14 96
Welfare 1 3 4 13 3 24
Business-Industry -
Banks 6 22 11 14 8 61
Tax-Revenue 11 29 22 34 43 139
Veterans'
Compensation 5 9 2 6 8 30
Prohibition 6 4 2 3 1 16
Appropriati ons 5 14 13 20 35 87
Claims-Pensions-
Compensation 0 0 0 1 3 4
Public Works 5 12 3 10 4 34
Public Power 11 10 21 4 10 56
Investigations 5 6 4 9 7 31
Race 0 0 0 1 4 5
Totals 129 184 220 275 556 1364
Republican cohesion in the 1920' s was markedly below
their "norm" for 1880-1940. They had less cohesion on. every
issue, for which there is information, than usual0 The
issues in the table below are arranged in order from the
least to most cohesion in the 19201 * s . ^




REPUBLICAN COHESION ACCORDING TO ISSUE FOR 
EACH CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE 




67 68 69 70 Cohesion
Prohibition 23.0 44.0 53.0 40.0
Public Works 44.0 32.0 52.0 45.0 43.3
Public Power - - 40.0 43.0 51.0 44.7
Agriculture 55.0 53.0 41,0 31.0 45.0
Veterans *
Compensation 45.0 59.0 47.0 — 50.3
Business-Industry-
Banks 64.0 55.0 48.0 36.0 50.8
Military Affairs 53.0 54.0 43.0 55.0 51.3
■Investigations 79.0 59.0 30.0 44.0 53.0
Immigration 82.0 63.0 21.0 — 55.3
Tax-Revenue 62.0 56.0 54.0 59.0 57.8
Senate Procedure 76.0 49.0 69.0 42.0 59.0
Welfare 64.0 56.0 59.0 — 59.7
Senate
Organization 76.0 64.0 57.0 44.0 60.3
Government
65.0Organization 61.0 56.0 74.0 69.0
Appointments 79.0 62.0 59.0 62.0 65.5
Foreign Policy 80.0 4 5.0 68.0 72.0 66.3
Tariff 75.0 — 78.0 48.0 67.0
Claims-Pensions-
78.0Compensation — 78.0 — —
Race 96.0 90.0 — 100.0 95.3
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TABLE 11
COMPARISON OF REPUBLICAN COHESION IN THE 
1920°S WITH THEIR AVERAGE COHESION 







Prohibition (liquor) 40.0 58.7 18.7
Agriculture 45.0 66.1 21.1
Veterans* Compensation 50.3 76.7 26. A
Business-Industry-Banks 50.8 57.7 6.9
Immigration 55.3 6A.1 8.8
Welfare 59.7 60.8 1.1
Tax-Revenue 57.8 6^.0 6.2
Foreign Policy 66.3 67.6 1.3
Tariff 67o0 80.9 13.9
All the preceding indices indicate a diminution of
party influence on Republican voting in the 1920*s. Party 
pressure, however, for voting conformity was far from 
negligible.
Chi-square analysis affirms that party membership 
was a determinant of the way Republican senators voted.
This measurement indicates that Republicans voted together, 
in excess of random arrangement, by averages of 12.02, 7 .96, 
7 .65, and 7.15 respectively in the 67th, 68th, 69th, and 
70th Congresses. There were wide differences of party 
influence from issue to issue, but it was easily perceived 
in every category.9
9The Republican chi-squares for Congresses and issues 
are in Appendix A. Their chi-square averages may exceed
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Even with the decrease in party unity, party member­
ship is the key to Senate voting practices in the 1920's.
Both parties, as reflected in the vote distribution graphs, 
cohesion indices, and chi-squares, had measurable divisions, 
but not of the magnitude often expressed in political 
literature. Overall, "twenties" politics has more similarity 
than dissimilarity with the general model of American poli­
tical processes and behavior.
In the investigation of party cohesion, an impression 
formed that the Republicans and Democrats had their own 
distinctive patterns of disunity. A table was constructed 
to enable convenient comparison of Democratic vis-a-vis 
Republican cohesion according to issue. The purpose was to 
discern whether the Republicans and Democrats had the same 
cohesion patterns. In Table 12, the difference in their 
cohesion is indicated in parenthesis beside the party with 
the most cohesion.
Each party had more cohesion than the other on ten 
issues. This information contributes to a clarification of 
historical interpretations with respect to party unity 
during the 1920's. Party cohesion does not have a monolithic
those for the Democrats although the Democrats have more 
cohesion. This is because chi-squares reflect the number 
in the group being measured; the more members of a group the 
higher the chi-square. Because there were more Republicans 




COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN 




Compensation 27.0 78.0 (51.0)
Public Power 37.3 44.7 ( 7.M
Prohibition 39.0 40.0 ( l.o)
Welfare 39.3 59.7 (20 A)
Immigration 39.3 55.3 (16.0 )
Agriculture 47.3 ( 2.3) ^5.0
Senate Procedure 49.5 59.0 ( 9.5)
Race 50.3 95.3 (^5.0)
Foreign Policy 56.3 66.3 (10.0)
Military Affairs 56.5 ( 5.2) 51.3
Public Works 58.0 (14.7) ^3.3
Government Organization 59.5 65.0 ( 5.5)
Business-Industry-Banks 62.8 (12.0) 50.8
Appropriations 63.5 65.3 ( 1.8)
Appointments 68.5 ( 3.0) 65.5
Veterans* Compensation 70.0 (19.7) 50.3
Tax-Revenue 70.5 (12.7) 57.8
Tariff 78.7 (11.7) 67.0
Senate Organization 84.8 (24.5) 60.3
Investigations 93.8 (40.8) 53.0
pattern, it fluctuates according to issue. Although the
Democrats had more cohesion overall during the 1920*s than 
the Republicans, this was not true on all issues. This 
comparison also enabled a delineation of respective patterns 
of Democratic and Republican cohesion.
The issues in this study can generally be defined as 
two types--substantive and non-substantive. Substantive 
issues are those of policy determination whereas the non­
substantive relate to procedure, partisanship, and party
59
loyalty. There is not, naturally, always a clear distinction 
between the two. It seemed, nevertheless, that there was a 
defensible rationale for classifying 16 issues as substantive 
and the remaining 4 issues as non-substantive. In the table 
below, the issues are identified as substantive and non­
substantive with a D or R in the adjoining column to indicate 
the party with the most cohesion on that issue.
TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC AMD REPUBLICAN 
COHESION ON SUBSTANTIVE AND 
NON-SUBSTAN'TIVE ISSUES ,
1921-29
Substantive Issues Party Non-substantive Issues Party
Claims-Pensions-
Compensation R Senate Procedure R
Public Power R Appointments D
Prohibition R Senate Organization D













The Republicans had more unity, sometimes by narrow 
margins, than the Democrats on 9 of the 16 substantive 
issues. On the non-substantive issues, the Democrats had
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more cohesion on 3 of the ^ issues. This suggests a funda­
mental difference in the nature of cohesion within each 
party. Democrats agreed less upon policy among themselves 
than Republicans, but they had more affinity upon partisan 
matters. Partisan issues are those upon which party 
affiliation should be the basic guide to voting behavior. 
Irrespective of policy differences, all partisans should vote 
together on issues that reflect their party exclusiveness. 
Senate organization is an illustration where, whatever other 
differences between party members, every Republican and 
Democrat should vote for their respective candidates for 
Senate offices. Whereas Republicans had mutuality that 
exceeded the Democrats on policy issues, they were less 
united upon issues when party loyalty should be the deter­
minant of voting conduct. Republican division seemed to be 
more politically based than Democratic fragmentation which 
appeared to stem from policy differences.
Both political parties were more divided during the 
1920's than normally. Their cohesion did vary signifi­
cantly, however, according to the Congress and issue. 
Moreover, there seemed to be a difference in the nature of 
discord within each party: Democrats had more unity upon 
party loyalty matters whereas the Republicans had more 
solidarity upon policy issues.
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Some plausible causes for the party cohesion patterns 
have already been alluded to in this chapter. A brief 
complementary section examining political conditions and 
attitudes may further clarify these patterns. The pronounced 
division between the parties in the 6?th Congress partially 
resulted from Republican determination to supplant Demo­
cratic policies with their own. Once their several major 
programs were adopted, the Republican leadership was 
basically satisfied to defend the status quo. The Repub­
lican hierarchy combined a simple pro-business policy with a 
determination to curtail governmental welfare responsibility. 
This and the fact that Republican programs could largely be 
implemented through the executive reduced confrontations in 
the Senate after the 6?th Congress and, therefore, the 
opportunities for division between the parties.^
The Democrats and unreliable Republicans were, often 
committed to mere obstruction of regular Republican pro­
grams. Their lack of originality in proposing measures 
reflected their restricted ken of governmental welfare and 
public interest obligations.^  Even if they had the 
necessary vision, it is unrealistic to assume that they 
could have enacted a comprehensive reform program into law. 
Although a Democratic-irregular Republican coalition could
l°Mayer, pp. 383-^•
ULink, Catton, and Leary, p. 325*
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sometimes pass bills in the Senate, the Republican execu­
tives could usually rely upon enough regular support to 
sustain their vetoes. There was little indication that the 
Supreme Court would find reform legislation constitutional 
if it was enacted into law. A majority of the justices 
were reactionaries and conservatives who zealously nullified 
laws which they believed were incompatible with laissez- 
faire e c o n o m i c s W i t h  these conditions, it is not sur­
prising that party unity eroded and that political issues 
were often largely unrelated to the public interest.
There is another view of politics in the 1920*s which 
requires restatement because it has either been assumed or 
overlooked. Historical emphasis has focused upon party 
dissension, insurgency, defection and irregularity with the 
resultant impression that there was virtual party anarchy in 
the 1920's. The evidence in the first three chapters 
supports the assertion that the parties were less unified, 
but it should also dispel the idea that there was massive 
party revolution.
The parties continued to organize and direct the 
contest for political power in American society, and to use
12por a constitutional history of the 1920's see 
Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 3rd ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963)» 685-721.
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government for their ends. To obtain and keep power in 
order to form public policy requires party regularity. The 
politician must give his primary allegiance to the party at 
the expense of his personal independence-party loyalty 
alone ensures party government. This was the pervasive 
practice even in the 1920's. The politics of this decade 
correspond more closely to the traditional political pattern 
than is usually conceded by historians. The remaining three 
chapters especially should contribute to establishing this 
theme of "twenties" politics.
CHAPTER IV
A MEASUREMENT OF THE PARTY LOYALTY OF 
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SENATORS
This study concentrates upon group voting patterns. 
However, group indices are only composites of voting deci­
sions made by individual senators. A voting profile of 
each senator is vital for an insight into the group 
statistics. It has a second important purpose in this 
chapter which is to test the generally accepted conclusion 
that party was eclipsed as the principal guide to voting 
behavior. The usual assertion is that both political 
parties had major internal cleaveages. Conservative Eastern 
Republicans were militant party regulars. This was in sharp 
contrast to many Midwestern and Western Republicans who 
expounded progressivism and were party irregulars; some 
senators in this group were known as insurgents. The Demo­
cratic party is often described as being divided along rural- 
urban lines which reflected ideological differences between 
the two groups. If party loyalty was markedly reduced in 
the 1920's, it should be reflected in an increase in voting 
irregularity. This chapter is a measurement of the voting 
reliability of Republican and Democratic senators.
The usual description of party politics fails to 
include either a definition of political regularity or provide
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a criteria by which to distinguish between regulars and 
irregulars. Admittedly, there is no sound intuitive way or 
cryptic mathematical formula to delineate these behavior 
patterns• Party regularity of senators can, however, be 
measured• Through this measurement, however, the perception 
of senators as only regulars or irregulars is modified to 
degrees of regularity. This means that a senator will not 
usually be seen as absolutely regular or irregular, he will 
be perceived as more or less regular in relation to his 
colleagues. Categorical norms of regularity and irregularity 
could be designed, but they would have no practical value 
in this study.
The second deficiency in the usual interpretation is 
that it seems based upon narrow research and sometimes inva­
lid materials. This is rectified by the loyalty index in 
this chapter which encompasses the voting record for all 
senators over every issue for the 1920Ss. As a result, 
any senator can be placed precisely in the spectrum of 
party dependability relative to every other senator. 
References are often made about senators as members of 
groups which implies a uniform group behavior. The loyalty 
index readily enables even subtle distinctions to be made 
between group members which impressionistically have 
identical political reliability, i.e., Eastern Repub­
licans may be more diverse in their dependability than is 
usually believed. When historians identify a senator as
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a member of a group, i.e., William E. Borah was a Western 
Republican insurgent, they are seldom in agreement if that 
senator was an authentic group member. The data from the 
loyalty index should enable more accurate judgments in the 
definition of groups and their members. It is conceivable 
that some senators, based upon their voting records, have 
been erroneously included or excluded from groups defined by 
their party regularity. The loyalty index is a way to test 
the accuracy of judgments made by historians about the 
political reliability or undependability of some senators. 
Precise data on the party reliability of each senator in the 
1920's is not available except in this study.
The following loyalty index is a modification of the 
standard loyalty index which only indicates the times and 
percentage that a senator votes with his party when at least 
90 per cent of each party are voting in opposition. Because 
the 90 per cent party vote is rare in the 1920's and, 
theoretically, a senator could vote with his party only under 
these conditions, it seemed more valid to determine senators' 
party regularity at different stages of party disagreement. 
The index indicates the number of times and percentage that 
a senator votes with his party under three different condi­
tions: (1 ) when he votes with a majority of his party 
irrespective of what the other party does; (2 ) when he votes 
with a majority of his party against a majority of the other
6?
party; and (3 ) when he votes with at least 90 per cent of 
his party against 90 per cent of the other party.
In the index, the number in parenthesis along the 
left hand margin indicates the Congress. There are eight 
columns in the table which, from the left to right hand 
margin, are; (1 ) the number of times that the senator voted 
with the majority of his party; (2 ) the percentage of times 
that the senator voted with his party; (3 ) the number of 
times that the senator voted against his party majority;
(4) the percentage of times that the senator voted against 
his party majority; (5 ) the number of times that the senator 
voted with a majority of his party against the majority of 
the other party; (6 ) the percentage of times that the senator 
voted with his party majority against a majority of the 
other party; (7 ) the number of times that the senator voted 
with his party when 90 per cent of each party were voting 
In opposition to the other; and (8) the percentage of times 
that the senator voted with 90 per cent of his party against 
90 per cent of the other party.
TABLE 14 
REPUBLICAN LOYALTY INDEX
Lewis H. Ball (Del.)
(67) 555 93.00 45 7.00 450






Frank B. Brandegree (Conn. )
(6?) 572 90.00 65 10.00 457 94.00 173 98.00
(68) 116 93.00
91.50




James Nr. Wadsworth, Jr. (N.Y.)
(67) 555 86.00 88 14.00 452 91.00 192 98.00
(68) 158 79.00 42 21.00 104 84.00 18 95.00
(69) 162 80.00
81.37
40 20.00 85 87.00
87.33
10 100.00
Philander C . Knox (Pa.)
(67) 90 69.00 13 31.00 40 82.00 7 100.00
Bert M. Fernald (Me . )
(67) 47 o 89.00 60 11.00 382 93.00 149 100.00
(68) 157 87.00 24 13.00 110 92.00 19 100.00
(69) 86 Z h 00 
83737




Joseph S. Frelinghuysen (N.J.)
(67) 528 88.00 73 12.00 425 94.00 174 100.00
William M. Calder (N.Y. )
(67) 55^ 90.00 61 10.00 453 96.00 175 99.00
Walter E. Edge (N.J .)
(67) 364 88.00 52 12.00 291 92.00 103 99.00
(68) 157 84.00 29 16.00 101 86,00 15 100.00
(69) 161 83.00 33 17.00 78 81.00 9 100.00
(70) 125 80.00 31 20.00 63 91.00 15 100.00 r\r\ r~i r'
83.75 87.50 99.75
69
Le Baron B. Colt (R.,1c )
(6?) 477 90.00 52 10.00 379 95.00 127 99.00
(68) 101 88.00
89.00




William P. Dillingham (Vt.)
(67) Ii43 89.00 53 11.00 359 97.00 l4l 99.00
Frederic Hale (Me.)
(6?) 616 93.00 47 7.00 48 5 96.00 193 99.00
(68) 193 94.00 12 6.00 122 95.00 18 100.00
(69) 200 88.00 28 12.00 99 92.00 11 100.00
(70) 146 81.00
B9.00




Henry W. Keyes (N.H.)
(67) 618 92.00 55 8.00 486 94.00 206 99.00
(68) 181 94.00 12 6.00 114 97.00 17 100.00
(69) 186 89.00 23 11.00 92 91.00 11 100.00
(70) 134 88.00
90.75




Henry C. Lodge (Mass. )
(67) 622 94.00 41 6.00 476 95.00 203 99.00
(68) 104 90.00
92.00




George P. McLean (Conn.)
(67) 540 92.00 50 8.00 447 96.00 171 97.00
(68) 140 84.00 26 16.00 107 90.00 17 100.00
(69) 145 84.00 27 16.00 68 88.00 7 88.00
(70) 93 76.00
B4.00





George H. Moses (N.H.)
(67) 482 86.00 81 14.00
(68) l6l 81.00 37 19.00




Carroll S . Page (Vt.)
(67) 536 94.00 37 6.00
Boies Penro•se (Pa. )
(67) 138 88.00 19 12.00
Thomas C. Du Pont (Del.)
(67) 272 94.00 18 6.00




William E. Crow (Pa.)
(67) 240 94.00 16 6.00
George W. Pepper (Pa .)
(67) 386 92.00 35 8.00




David A. Reed (Pa.)
(67) 116 88.00 16 12.00
(68) 153 78.00 42 22.00
(69) 176 79.00 46 21.00
(70) 135 76.00 
80.2 5
43 24.00
394 91.00 163 91.00
107 86.00 19 100.00





407 95.00 169 97.00
71 97.00 17 100.00
251 91.00 109 95.00





195 93.00 96 100.00
344 94.00 156 99.00





89 91.00 22 96.00
103 85.00 19 100.00






Porter H. Dale (Vt.)
(68) 160 87.00 23 13.00 96 81.00 19 100.00
(69) 140 84,00 27 16.00 62 84.00 8 89.00
(70) 86 69.00
80.00




Frank L. Greene (Vt. )
(68) 96 84.00 18 16.00 81 92.00 19 100.00
(69) 114 86.00 19 14.00 52 91.00 4 100.00
(70) 119 82,00
84700




William M. Butler (Mass.)
(68) 59 84.00 11 16.00 37 88.00 1 100.00
(69) 140 93.00
88.50




Jesse H. Metcalf (R.I.)
(68) 57 80.00 14 20.00 38 86.00 4 100.00
(69) 179 86.00 29 14.00 93 91.00 9 90.00
(70) 116 78.00
81.33




Hiram Bingham (Conn .)
(68) 50 77.00 15 23.00 33 87.00 4 100.00
(69) 149 75.00 50 25.00 76 84.00 9 82.00
(70) 130 75.00
75.67




Frederick H. Gillette (Mass.)
(69) 136 84.00 25 16.00 61 86.00 4 80.00
(70) 97 78.00
81.00





Arthur R. Gould (Me .)
(69) 37 84.00 7 16,00 20 83.OO 3 100.00
(70) 74 85.00
WTT50




Daniel 0. Hastings (Del.)
(70) A4 94.00 3 6.00 13 93.00 1 100.00
Harry 13. New (Ind.)
(6 7) 541 91.00 54 9.00 442 95.00 164 99.00
Arthur Capper (Kansas)
(67) 522 73.00 192 27.00 386 71.00 181 89.00
(68) 140 71.00 58 29.00 72 59.00 17 89.00
(69) 161 79.00 42 21.00 72 73.00 9 100.00
(70) 123 69.00
73.00




Albert B, Cummins (Iowa)
(67) 407 78.00 118 22.00 305 76.00 106 83.00
(68) 125 77.00 38 23.00 73 71.00 10 100.00
(69) 93 79.00
78.00





(67) 568 94.00 42 6.00 514 95.00 201 100.00
(68) 189 93.00 15 7.00 116 93.00 18 95.00
(69) 176 89.00 22 11.00 83 89.00 10 100.00
(70) 153 87.00
90.75




Frank B. Kellogg (Minne.)
(67) 530 82.00 115 18.00 417 83.00 162 90.00
73
Edwin F. Ladd (N.D,)
(67) 447 80.00 111 20.00 335 78.00 138 91.00
(68) 96 55.00 79 45.00 35 33.00 4 29.00
(69) 4 36,00
57.00




Robert Mo La Follette (Wis.)
(6?) 184 34,00 35^ 66,00 90 23.00 37 26.00
(68) 25 42.00
38.00




Irving Lc Lenroot (Wis,)
(67) 512 81,00 122 19.00 383 79.00 159 93.00
(68) 94 83.00 19 17.00 71 89.00 15 94.00
(69) 134 Zls.00
79.67




J. Medill Me Cormick (111 .)
(67) 436 85.00 77 15.00 319 86.00 129 90.00
(68) 104 92.00 
88 0 50




Porter J. MeCumber (N.D.)
(67) 578 90.00 66 10.00 462 92.00 198 96.00
William B. McKinley (111. )
(67) 529 92.00 46 8.00 417 95.00 183 99.00
(68) 172 90.00 19 10.00 107 91.00 19 100.00
(69) 63 85.00
89.00




Knute Nelson (Minne .)
(67) 471 84,00 88 16.00 351 87.00 153 92.00
7b
Peter ]tforbeck (S.D.)
(67) 350 74.00 124 26.00
(68) 73 53.00 68 47.00




George W. Norris (Neb.)
(67) 149 42.00 202 58.00
(68) 80 42.00 110 58.00









Charles E. Townsend. (Mich.)
(67) 546 88.00 75 12.00
James E. Watson (Ind.)
(67) 565 94.00 37 6.00
(68) 165 93.00 12 7.00
(69) 181 90.00 21 10.00
(70) 137 86.00 23 14.00
90.75
261 77.00 106 91.00
43 44.00 15 88.00





121 41.00 20 16.00
32 27.00 4 25.00










418 89.00 184 94.00
437 98.00 176 93.00
110 96.00 18 100.00






Frank B. Willis (Ohio)
(67) 514 86.00 86 14.00 385 85.00 174 98.00
(68) 151 77.00 44 23.00 109 84.00 19 100.00
(69) 199 88.00 28 12.00 94 90.00 11 100.00
(70) 36 69.00
80.00




William S. Kenyon (Iowa)
(67) 144 61.00 92 39.00 37 32.00 8 22.00
Truman H. Newberry (Mich. )
(67) 446 91.00 44 9.00 328 84.00 156 100.00
Charles A. Rawson (Iowa)
(67) 308 90.00 33 10.00 220 81.00 100 91.00
Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa)
(67) 23 3 8.00 37 62.00 14 33.00 3 50.00
(68) 88 43.00 118 57.00 31 25.00 5 28.00
(69) 22 30.00 52 70.00 4 13.00 1 25.00
(70) 91 49.00
40.00





(67) 25 60.00 17 40.00 17 57.00 3 100.00
(68) 108 74.00 37 26.00 65 70.00 18 95.00
(69) 125 64.00 71 36.00 47 50.00 6 75.00
(70) 118 68.00
£6750





Simeon D. Fess (Ohio )
(68) 159 82.00 34 18.00 100 82.00 18 95.00
(69) 193 88.00 26 12.00 95 90.00 11 100.00
(70) 141 83.00
84.33




Lynn J . Frazier (N.D.)
(68) 91 46.00 108 54.00 34 27.00 6 32.00
(69) 89 42.00 124 58.00 33 33.00 4 50.00
(70) 77 52.00
46767




Robert B. Howell (Neb.)
(68) 89 47.00 100 53.00 39 33.00 6 38.00
(69) 92 48.00 100 52.00 29 33.00 4 50.00
(70) 64 57.00
50.67




Charles S. Deneen (111. )
(68) 2 100.00 0 0.00 1 100.00
(69) 182 89.00 22 11.00 84 89.00 11 100.00
(70) 150 89.00
92767
19 11.00 63 86.00 17 100.00
100.00
Thomas D. £3chall (Minne.)
(69) 159 82.00 35 18.00 77 83.00 9 100.00
(70) 142 84.00
83.00




William H. McMaster (S.D.)
(69) 132 61.00 84 39.00 54 53.00 8 73.00
(70) 99 i2j-00
59.00





Arthur R, Robinson (Ind.)
(69) 159 84.00 31 16.00 71 80.00 6
(70) 128 82.00
83.00
28 18.00 44 69.00
74.50
11
Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.)
(69) 89 44.00 113 56.00 34 37.00 3
(70) 80 54.00
49700
69 46.00 33 48.00
42.50
16
Gerald P. Nye (N.D.)
(69) 74 42.00 102 58.00 24 31.00 2
(70) 98 54.00
48.00
85 46.00 40 50.00
4o750
16
David ’W. Stewart (Iowa)
(69) 58 82.00 13 18.00 26 74.00 4
John J , Blaine (Wis .)
(70) 90 47.00 100 53.00 41 49.00 16
Otis F. Glenn (111. )
(70) 4? 81.00 11 19.00 16 80.00 1
Theodore E. Burton (Ohio)
(70) 29 78.00 8 22.00 11 100.00 1
William E. Borah (Idaho)
(67) 197 40.00 281 60.00 132 36.00 48
(68) 95 52.00 86 48.00 46 41.00 12
(69) 83 48.00 91 52.00 41 49.00 5
(70) 83 54.00
48.50






















Holm C». Bursum (N.M. )
(67) 588 89.00 75 11.00 470 92.00 192 99.00
(68) 184 93.00
91.00




Ralph H. Cameron (Arz.)
(67) 549 89.00 67 11.00 442 94.00 157 98.00
(68) 185 92.00 16 8.00 113 92.00 18 100.00
(69) 174 81.00
87.33




Frank R. Gooding (Id .)
(67) 564 87.00 84 13.00 453 89.00 187 98.00
(68) 12 5 63.00 75 38.00 63 50.00 17 100.00
(69) 163 79.00 44 21.00 73 73.00 9 90.00
(70) 52 76.00
76725




Hiram W. Johnson (Calif.)
(67) 2 88 64.00 162 36.00 228 66.00 99 86.00
(68) 82 56.00 65 44.00 42 43.00 13 87.00
(69) 97 50.00 97 50.00 37 40.00 5 63.00
(70) 116 69.00
59.75
52 31.00 46 61.00
52.50
15 100.00
" W o o
Wesley L. Jones (Wash.)
(67) 533 80.00 134 20.00 423 82.00 184 94.00
(68) 143 68.00 67 32.00 77 59.00 17 89.00
(69) 181 78.00 52 22.00 79 72.00 10 91.00
(70) 131 75.00
75.25





Charles L. McNary (Ore.)
(6?) 542 82.00 122 18.00 408 83.00 172 84.00
(68) l6l 77.00 47 23.00 88 69.00 16 89.00
(69) 153 70.00 66 30.00 61 60.00 8 73.00
(70) 132 75.00
76700




Samuel D. Nicholson (Colo.)
(67) 503 90.00 59 10.00 403 92.00 168 99.00
Tasker L. Oddie (Nev.)
(67) 609 91.00 57 9.00 489 95.00 202 94.00
(68) 200 95.00 11 5.00 125 95.00 19 100.00
(69) 197 88.00 27 12.00 90 87.OO 11 100.00
(70) 159 85.00
89.75




Lawrence C. Phipps (Colo.)
(67) 618 92.00 92 8.00 435 87.00 208 99.00
(68) 177 90.00 20 10.00 115 93.00 19 100.00
(69) 161 78.00 45 22.00 80 81.00 10 100.00
(70) 146 85.00
66.25




Miles Poindexter (Wash. )
(67) 526 90.00 57 10.00 438 94.00 164 94.00
Samuel M. Shortridge (Calif.)
(67) 550 90.00 64 10.00 437 94.00 180 94.00
(68) 155 91.00 15 9.00 97 92.00 19 100.00
(69) 193 89.00 23 11.00 92 90.00 10 100.00
(70) 133 86.00
89.00






(67) 583 93.00 46 7.00 481 95.00 193 99.00
(68) l6o 86.00 25 14.00 109 88.00 19 100.00
(69) 143 90.00 16 10.00 67 92.00 7 100.00
(70) 114 83.00 
B8.00




Robert N. ;Stanfield (Ore.)
(67) 510 88.00 72 12.00 400 90.00 156 93.00
(68) 146 83.00 29 17.00 92 81.00 16 94.00
(69) 149 81.00
84700




Francis E. Warren (Wyo.)
(67) 575 91.00 57 9.00 460 96.00 190 94.00
(68) 150 88.00 21 12.00 105 95.00 18 100.00
(69) 173 87.00 27 14.00 84 88.00 9 100.00
(70) 114 79.00
8 0 5




Rice W. Means (Colo .)
(68) 62 93.00 5 7.00 38 90.00 4 100.00
(69) 121 83.00
'88.00




Charles W. Waterman (Colo. )
(70) 128 73.00 47 27.00 59 77.00 15 88.00
Frederick Steiwer (Ore.)
(70) 139 84.00 26 16.00 58 83.00 13 93.00
Bronson M. Cutting (N.M.)
(70) 89 85.00 16 15.00 40 85.00 12 100.00
Octaviano A. Lazzazolo (N.M.)
(70) 16 73.00 6 27.00 2 33.00
John Thomas (Idaho)
(70) 53 85.00 9 15.00 17 81.00 1 100.00
Davis Elkins (W.Va.)
(67) 475 89.OO 57 11.00 410 97.00 160 99.00
(68) 73 76.00
82.50




Joseph I. France (Md. )
(67) 463 80.00 115 20.00 373 83.OO 157 96.00
Richard. P. Ernst (Ky.)
(67) 560 92.00 48 8.00 451 96.00 163 99.00
(68) 148 87.00 22 13.00 101 94.00 18 100.00
(69) 166 89.00
89.33




John W. Harreld (Okla.)
(67) 498 89.00 64 11.00 390 90.00 162 98.00
(68) 158 77.00 46 23.00 101 80.00 19 100.00
(69) 132 73.OO
79.67




Seldon P. Spencer (Mo. )
(67) 539 92.00 48 8.00 407 92.00 159 89.00







Howard Sutherland (VJ. Va.)
(67) 601 91.00 59 9.00 462 92.00 197 97.00
82
Ovington E. Weller (Md.)
(67) 497 93.00 37 7.00 381 95.00 157 99.00
(68) 115 85.00 21 15.00 82 87.00 15 100.00
(69) 138 79.00
85TS7




Guy D. Goff (W.Va.)












WilliairL P. Pine (Okla.)
(69) 168 79.00 45 21.00 84 82.00 9 100.00
(70) 106 79.00
79.00




Frederic M. Sackett (Ky. )
(69) 196 89.OO 25 11.00 89 86.00 9 100.00
(70) 150 86.00
87.50




George H. Williams (Mo. )
(69) 9/4, 79.00 25 21.00 31 94.00 3 100.00
The tables, for practical purposes, nearly interpret 
themselves. There are two tendencies, nevertheless, reflected 
in the Republican loyalty index which require brief exposi­
tion. Virtually every Republican senator, regardless of 
reliability, responded, however slightly, to party pressure. 
When disagreement between the parties became more pronounced, 
the tendency was for Republicans to increase their regularity.
83
Only three Republicans voted more with their party, irrespec­
tive of the degree of Democratic opposition, than they did 
when 90 per cent of both parties were in opposition. A 
more valid gauge of party influence is to determine Republi­
can response only on those votes with the parties in conflict. 
William S. Kenyon (Iowa), who voted relatively few times, was 
the only Republican not to vote more with his party when 
both parties were at least 90 per cent in opposition than 
when they 'were only 50 per cent or more in opposition. With 
this exception, party affiliation was a discernible influence 
on all Republicans as disagreement between the parties 
intensified.
This does not mean that there was not a hard core of 
Republican recalcitrants. Consistent with the usual thesis, 
a number of Westerners and Midwesterners took their party 
affiliation casually, and party membership often seemed to be 
a secondary guide to the way they voted. There were 11 
Republicans (William E. Borah (Id.), John J. Blaine (Wis.), 
Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.), Gerald P. Nye (N.D.),
Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.), George W. Norris (Neb.), Robert M. La 
Follette (Wis.), William S. Kenyon (Iowa), Robert B. Howell 
(Neb.), Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa) and Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.) 
who voted more with the Democrats than their own party when 
50 per cent or more of each party were in opposition. When 
90 per cent or over in each party voted against each other,
84
the number of senators voting more with the opposition than 
their own party was reduced to four, Robert M. La Follette 
(Wis.), George VJ. Norris (Neb.), William S. Kenyon (Iowa), 
and Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa). The above senators are those 
usually identified as the political unreliables in historical 
literature. The Republican Party was afflicted with an 
unprecedented group of low loyalty senators.
TABLE 15 
DEMOCRATIC LOYALTY INDEX
David I. Walsh (Mass.)
(67) 497 86.00 82 14.00 368 87.00 166 95.00
(68) 159 80.00 41 20,00 99 78.00 18 95.00
(69) 52 73.00 19 27.00 27 77.00 3 100.00
(70) 135 77.00
79.00




Josiah 0. 1Wolcott (Del.)
(67) 77 91.00 7 9.00 30 92.00 7 100.00
Thomas f . ;Bayard, .Jr. (Del-.)
(67) 58 79.00 15 21.00 41 79.00 12 100.00
(68) 149 72.00 58 28.00 92 71.00 17 89.00
(69) 148 72.00 57 28.00 63 66,00 7 88.00
(70) 112 66.00
72.25





William C. Bruce (Md.)
(68) 120 59.00 82 41.00 64 52.00 13 68.00
(69) 127 62,00 79 38.00 37 39*00 4 44.00
(70) 110 67.00 
ST. 67




Royal S. Copeland (N.Y.)
(68) 154 79.00 41 21.00 102 82.00 18 95.00
(69) 164 77.00 48 23.00 78 75.00 10 100.00
(70) 128 79.00
78.33"




Edward I. Edwards (N.J.)
(68) 119 73.00 45 27.00 78 73.00 16 89.00
(69) 153 75.00 51 25.00 70 69.00 6 75.00
(70) 105 77.00
75.00




Robert F. Wagner (N.Y.)
(70) 137 84.00 27 16.00 59 83.00 16 100.00
Gilbert M. Hitchcock (Neb .)
(67) 511 90.00 56 10.00 402 91.00 157 98.00
Atlee Pomerene (Ohio )
(67) 483 82.00 105 18.00 372 82.00 168 94.00
Woodbridge N. Ferris (Mich.)
(68) 160 84.00 30 16.00 100 84.00 17 89.00
(69) 155 77.00 47 23.00 68 74.00 9 100.00
(70) 42 91.00
84.00





Samuel M. Ralston (Ind.)
(68) 162 88.00 23 12.00 97 87.00 19 100.00
(69) 9 82.00 2 18.00 6 100.00 2 100.00
85.00 93.50 100.00
Daniel F. Steck (Iowa)
(69) 105 81.00 25 19.00 41 65.OO 7 100.00
(70) 123 76.00
78.50





(70) 50 82.00 11 18.00 21 81.00 8 100.00
Edwin S. Broussard (La.)
(67) 277 48.00 303 52.00 178 41.00 61 40.00
(68) 167 81.00 38 19.00 102 80.00 18 95.00
(69) 168 82,00 36 18.00 77 80.00 8 100.00
(70) 132 77.00
72.00
40 23.00 57 76.00 16 94.00
82.25
Charles A. Culberson (Texas)
(67) 518 94.00 36 1 6.00 4l4 95.00 161 99.00
Thaddeus H . Caraway- (Ark. )
(67) 537 93.00 40 7.00 432 97.00 174 100.00
(68) 163 86.00 26 14.00 106 88.00 18 95.00
(69) 150 84.00 28 16.00 73 83.00 5 100.00
(70) 140 87.OO
87.50




Nathaniel B. Dial (S.C, )
(67) 546 86.00 89 14.00 449 90.00 179 98.00
(68) 152 78.00
82.00





Duncan U. Fletcher (Fla. )
(67) 54 2 88.00 75 12.00 420 88.00 182 99.00
(68) 182 88.00 24 12.00 113 90.00 19 100.00
(69) 132 84.00 25 16.00 53 77.00 7 100.00
(70) 125 82.00
85.50
28 18.00 65 92.00 16 100.00
99.75
Carter Glass (Va.)
(67) 434 88.00 58 12.00 329 91.00 138 100.00
(68) 148 80.00 37 20.00 94 80.00 16 94.00
(69) 137 76.00 44 24.00 55 63.OO 7 86.00
(70) 133 83.00
81.75




William J. Harris 1(Ga • )
(67) 549 91.00 53 9.00 435 95.00 176 100.00
(68) 174 92.00 16 8.00 114 97.00 18 100.00
(69) 187 86.00 30 14.00 95 92.00 11 100.00
(70) 139 78.00
86.75




Byron P. Harrison (Miss. )
(67) 545 95.00 30 5.00 439 98.00 169 99.00
(68) 163 84.00 30 16.00 101 86.00 16 100.00
(69) 177 91.00 18 9.00 83 90.00 10 100.00
(70) 144 86.00
89.00





KennethL  D. McKellar (Tenn. )
(6?) 518 90.00 58 10.00
(68) 189 91.00 19 9.00




Lee S . Overman (N.C .)
(67) 570 92.00 50 8.00
(68) 1-64 88.00 22 12.00




Robert L. Owen (Okla.)




Joseph E. Ransdell (La. )
(67) 291 65.OO 154 '35.00
(68) 154 87.00 23 13.00
(69) 168 82.00 36 18.00
(70) 104 81.00
W 7 T 5
24 19.00
Joseph T. Robinson (Ark.)
(67) 559 88.00 76 12.00
(68) 158 86.00 25 14.00




363 93.00 140 88.00
117 91.00 19 100.00





465 95.00 196 98.00
107 91.00 17 94.00





222 87.00 85 93.00




220 61.00 89 75.00
96 86.00 18 95.00





465 95.00 197 99.00
92 83.00 17 94.00







(67) 630 88.00 85 12.00 475 90.00 202 92.00
(68) 177 83.00 35 17.00 115 88.00 19 100.00
(69) 197 85,00 35 15.00 97 88,00 10 100.00
(70) 149 78.00
83.50




John K. Shields (Tenn. )
(67) 492 86.00 81 14.00 404 93.00 177 97.00
(68) 140 84.00
B5T00




Furnifold M . Simmons (N.C.,)
(67) 556 94.00 37 6.00 451 96.00 172 97.00
(68) 180 90.00 20 10.00 115 92.00 18 95.00
(69) 170 89.00 20 11.00 67 83.00 10 100.00
(70) 140 90.00
90.75




Ellison D. Smith (S.C. )
(67) 515 86.00 82 ‘14.00 399 90.00 174 92.00
(68) 143 86.00 24 14.00 81 90.00 10 91.00
(69) 152 83.00 31 17.00 67 87.00 7 100.00
(70) 135 83.00
84.50




Augustus 0. Stanley (Ky. )
(67) 522 90.00 61 10.00 427 93.00 99.00
(68) 129 88.00
89.00





Claoide A. Swanson (Va.)
(67) 56 0 94.00 36 6.00 446 93.00 206 99.00
(68) 176 88.00 24 12.00 109 90.00 18 95.00
(69) 155 86.00 26 14.00 62 78.00 9 90.00
(70) 141 88.00
89.00





(67) 503 91.00 51 9.00 371 91.00 146 97.00
(68) 170 89.00 20 11.00 109 93.00 17 100.00
(69) 171 85.00 31 15.00 91 89.00 10 100.00
(70) 887 79.00
86700




Oscar W. Underwood (Ala.)
(67) 546 83.00 111 17.00 418 85.00 192 95.00
(68) 144 80.00 35 20.00 100 86.00 15 100.00
(69) 72 67.00
76787




James A. Reed (Mo.)
(67) 466 85.00 81 15.00 364 91.00 161 97.00
(68) 147 86.00 24 14.00 98 88.00 17 94.00
(69) 97 59.00 68 41.00 64 78.00 6 100.00
(70) 91 7 4.00 
76.OO




John S. Williams (Miss.)
(67) 456 84.00 89 16.00 34 6 85.00 133 92.00
91
James T. Heflin (Ala.)
(6?) 604 93.00 46 7.00 448 94.00 199 100.00
(68) 181 90.00 21 10.00 115 93.00 18 100.00
(69) 182 84.00 34 16.00 88 89.00 9 90.00
(70) 144 78.00
86.25




Thomas Ec Watson (Ga.)
(67) 341 82.00 62 18.00 259 85.00 86 91.00
Walter F. George (Ga.)
(67) 64 88.00 9 12.00 45 83.00 14 100.00
(68) 174 86.00 29 14.00 111 89.00 18 95.00
(69) 169 85.00 29 15.00 84 88.00 9 100.00
(70) 133 82.00
85.25




Earle B. Mayfield (Texas)
(68) 164 87.00 24 13.00 110 92.00 19 100.00
(69) 183 86.00 29 14.00 88 89.00 10 91.00
(70) 129 81.00
84.67




Matthew M. Neely (W.Va.)
(68) 171 85.00 30 15.00 110 88.00 19 100.00
(69) 164 78.00 47 22.00 79 81.00 7 88.00
(70) 130 78.00
80.33





Hubert D. Stephens (Miss.)
(68) 145 84.00 27 16.00 94 8 7.00 15 94.00
(69) 167 87.00 24 13.00 83 90.00 9 100.00
(70) 132 86.00 
85737




Coleman L. Blease 1[S.C. )
(69) 120 55.00 99 45.00 78 75.00 9 90.00
(70) 84 £8.0° 
5^.50




Lawrence D. Tyson 1(Tenn.)
(69) 184 88.00 26 12.00 81 85.00 9 100.00
(70) 125 86.00 
'87.00




Harry B. Hawes (Mo .)
(69) 58 84.00 11 16.00 22 67.00 3 100.00
(70) 128 82.00 
B3 .OO




Alben W. Barkley (Ky. )
(70) 152 85.00 26 15.00 69 88.00 17 100.00
Hugo L. Black (Ala .)
(70) 127 71.00 52 29.00 70 88.00 16 100.00
John W. E. Thomas (Okla. )
(70) 125 76.00 40 24.00 63 86.00 17 100.00
Millard E. Tydings (Md. )
(70) 108 72.00 42 28.00 50 75.00 12 100.00
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Henry F. Ashurst (Ariz.)
(67) 542 85.00 92 15.00
(68) 146 85.00 26 15.00




Andrieus A. Jones (N.M.)
(67) 482 84.00 92 16.00
(68) 167 86.00 28 14.00




John B. Kendrick (Wy0 . )
(67) 342 57.00 259 43.00
(68) 175 85.00 32 15.00
(69) 167 77.00 51. 23.00
(70) 123 78.00
W T z S
35 . 22.00
William H. King (Utah)
(67) 44 5 78.00 125 22.00
(681 119 64.00 67 36.00
(69) 113 58.00 81 42.00
(70) 69 46.00 80 54.00
Henry L. Meyers (Mont.)
(67) 350 77.00 104 23.00
433 89.OO 181 99.00
99 88.00 17 100.00





396 88.00 175 98.00
101 83.00 19 100.00





225 48.00 77 48.00
98 77.00 18 100.00





378 87.00 154 96.00
79 65.00 17 89.00





286 77.00 140 95.00
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Key Pittman (Nev.)
(67) 475 92.00 42 8.00 355 92.00 166 99.00
(68) 148 84.00 28 16.00 93 88.00 18 95.00
(69) 132 87.00 19 13.00 62 85.00 8 100.00
(70) 105 83.00
8F750




Thomas J. Walsh (Mont.)
(67) 514 91.00 52 9.00 395 92.00 164 95.00
(68) 158 85.00 28 15.00 98 84.00 19 100.00
(69) 146 71.00 61 29.00 69 70.00 7 100.00
(70) 125 77.00
81.00




Alva B., Adams (Colo.)
(68) 107 82.00 24 18.00 63 79.00 13 93.00
Clarence C. Dill (Wash.)
(68) 158 80.00 39 20.00 96 79.00 18 95.00
(69) 131 65.00 70 35.00 76 78.00 10 91.00
(70) 128 72.00
72.33




Burton K. Wheeler (Mont.)
(68) 144 86.00 24 14.00 101 91.00 18 100.00
(69) 122 65.00 65 35.00 66 79.00 9 90.00
(70) 101 67.00
72.67




Sam G. Bratton (N.M.)
(69) 182 85.00 31 15.00 89 86.00 9 90.00
(70) 126 79.00
B2.00






(70) 140 81.00 32 19.00 68 87.00 17 100.00
Peter G. Gerry (R.I. )
(6?) 515 89.00 63 11.00 411 92.00 168 99.00
(68) 130 80,00 33 20.00 77 7 8.00 15 94.00
(69) 143 80.00 35 20,00 71 85.00 8 100.00
(70) 118 81,00
82.50




As a group, the Democrats have more reliability than 
the Republicans. There are low loyalty Democrats, but none 
.are as irregular as the most intransigent Republicans. The 
least regular Democrat was William C. Bruce (Md. ) who voted 
with his party 52 per cent when the majorities were in 
opposition and 58*67 when they were 90 per cent or more in 
disagreement. This is significantly more regular than 
Robert M. La Follette, (Wis.) and William S. Kenyon (Iowa), 
the lowest loyalty Republicans. No Democrat voted overall 
more with the Republicans than his own party under any con­
dition. Also, all Democrats increased in party regularity 
as the division between the two parties became more pro­
nounced. Most of the less regular Democrats achieved their 
low loyalty percentages on one issue--the tariff. This, 
for example, explains the low loyalty percentages for Edwin 
S. Broussard (La.) and John B. Kendrick (Wyo.). Excluding 
William C. Bruce, no Democratic senator has a pattern of 
obstruction comparable to several Republicans. Democrats,
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unlike the Republicans, always voted together on key party 
issues such as the election of Senate officers and committee 
chairmen. It is also significant that there is not a 
sectional pattern of regularity and irregularity in the 
Democratic party as in the Republican party. There were 
crucial differences between groups of Democrats, but it was 
not reflected in the voting profiles as with the Republicans.
This loyalty index supports the conclusions from 
chapters two and three-party was the decisive influence 
upon the way that most senators voted in the 1920's. The 
Democrats especially, with only minor exceptions, demon­
strated an extraordinary degree of party commitment. This 
may be attributed to their position as a minority party 
which only required that they oppose the Republican adminis­
trations. Whatever the ideological and cultural antagonisms 
between Democrats, they were not appreciably reflected in 
their voting profiles. Political irregularity was basically 
a Republican practice. This should not obscure the fact 
that the preponderant Republican majority was exceptionally 
regular, and that even the defiant Republicans usually 
responded to party pressure. Republican irregularity 
is probably a very reliable gauge of independence because 
the intransigents are voting in opposition to their 
administration and party program. These Republican 
intransigents are examined in the next chapter•
CHAPTER V
THE REPUBLICAN INSURGENTS: THEIR 
PARTI PRACTICES AND THE 
LIBERAL TRADITION
The common historical thesis of the 1920{s is that 
reform zeal persisted and survived despite conservative 
political domination A genuine dissident group, as it is 
usually told, consisted of Midwestern and Western Repub­
lican senators who reflected the progressive political 
philosophy, practiced insurgency against the regular-conser- 
vative Republican leadership, and received adulation from 
followers for their determination and integrity,, This inter­
pretation is disputed by several historians who believe that 
many self-anointed insurgents invoked the rhetoric of pro- 
gressivism and independence, but behaved timidly and 
hypocritically at crucial "moments of truth,," The purpose of 
this chapter is to contribute to resolving this historio­
graphical quarrel, and to clarify and propose revisions in 
the general conceptions about Republican insurgency,, 1
3-The standard thesis is defended by Nye, Midwestern 
Progressive Politics; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy; Mayer,
The Republican Party; Binkley, American Political Parties; 
Moos, The Republicans; and Arthur S. Link, "What Happened 
to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?," American 
Historical Review, LXIV (July, 1959), 833-51. Exception to 
their position is taken by Richard Hofstadter, The Age of 
Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1955.)
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Some of the controversy between historical "schools" 
can be attributed to their major reliance upon traditional 
research methods. This dependence often results in unsyste­
matic analysis with confusion over the practices which 
constitute insurgencjr, vague descriptions of its scope and 
intensity, and disagreement in the identification of insur­
gents, By the application of methodology more adapted to 
the topic, some of these deficiencies could be eliminated.
The failure to adequately define insurgency is 
responsible for most of the bewilderment over its meaning. 
Historians seem to have four ideas as to what constituted 
insurgency. It is quite probable that historians have 
identified a Republican senator as an insurgent if, in 
their judgment, he: (1 ) identified himself publicly as 
an independent or was critical of the Republican execu­
tives and colleagues within the party; (2 ) voted con­
sistently against his party majority; (3 ) refused to 
fulfill the traditional obligations of party membership; 
and (k) was a progressive. The first determinant of 
insurgency is excluded from this analysis. There is 
already sufficient documentation from the insurgents them­
selves as to their avowed independence and opposition to 
party conformity. Public expressions by politicians, 
however, may or may not correspond to their behavior. This 
analysis disregards the rhetoric and concentrates upon 
ascertaining actual behavior. The latter three criteria are
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systematically applied to the Senate membership from the 67th 
through the 70th Congress both to identify the insurgents 
and discern their degree of independence.
Voting irregularity is often perceived as insurgency.
A selective loyalty index, based upon the 136^ Senate roll- 
call votes between 1921 and 1929» was constructed to deter­
mine whether the senators voting most against their party 
were the same as those usually known as insurgents. The 
index was restricted to the 15 senators with the lowest 
loyalty percentages.
The loyalty table affirms that voting irregularity 
was predominantly a Western characteristic. There are 
exceptions, but most of the lowest loyalty percentage sena­
tors are the traditional insurgents in historical writing.
For perspective, however, it should be indicated that the 
number of senators with low loyalty percentages is not as 
imposing when related to the total number of Republican 
senators during the era. The index also includes some 
senators with loyalty percentages that can not be defined as 
habitual opposition to their party.
Voting irregularity is not the only or perhaps the 
most valid gauge of insurgency. The nature of the political 
system enables politicians to have a high degree of independ­
ence upon substantive issues irrespective of party policy.
The party code obligates the politician to: (1) support the
TABLE 16
SELECTIVE LOYALTY INDEX FOR REPUBLICAN SENATORS, 1921-1929
Senator Times and Percentage 
voting with a Repub­
lican majority 
against a Democratic 
majority
Times and Percentage 
voting with 90 per 
cent of their party 
against 90 per cent 
of the Democrats
William S. Kenyon (Iowa) 37 32.00 8 22.00
Robert M. La Follette (Wis.) 101 25.50 38 29.50
George W. Norris (Neb,) 223 37.75 43 46.25
Smith W, Brookhart (Iowa) 87 29.50 24 47.75
Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.) 97 34.67 21 58.00
Robert B. Howell (Neb,) 95 38.67 21 60.00
Robert M, La Follette, Jr. (Wis.) 67 42.50 19 63.50
Gerald P, Nye (N.D.) 64 40.50 18 63.50
William E, Borah (Idaho) 262 45.75 81 66,25
Edwin Ladd (N.D.) 371 42.67 143 73.33
William H. McMaster (S.D.) 92 50.50 20 74.00
Hiram W. Johnson (Calif,) 353 52.50 132 84.00
Charles L. McNary (Ore.) 610 69.50 211 85.00
Charles W, Waterman (Colo.) 47 27.00 15 88.00
Peter Norbeck (S.D.) 392 61.50 139 89.50
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party slate for legislative offices and. standing committees; 
(2) endorse the party presidential candidate; (3) vote for 
major partisan appointments and; (^) vote with the party 
when partisanship itself is an issue,2 The way in which 
the Republican senators respond to these obligations is an 
effective rationale for distinguishing between party regu­
lars and insurgents.
Some Midwesterners refused, in varying degrees, to 
comply -with these party responsibilities, A few senators 
were intransigent and chronic in their insurgency whereas 
others were less aggressive and intermittent in its practice. 
There were only eight Republican senators in the 1920's who
violated even a single party obligation. Generally, the
senators who voted most against their party were also those 
who showed a propensity to violate the rules of party member­
ship, For the 1920's, voting irregularity is quite a 
reliable indicator of other and more intractable insurgency. 
An implacable protest was generated from a few Mid- 
westerners when Albert B, Cummins (Iowa) was proposed, at 
the beginning of the 69th Congress in 1923» for chairman of 
the Interstate Commerce Committee,3 This was a genuine
^Common denominators of congressional partisans are 
found in Roland Young, The American Congress (New York:
Harper and Row, 1958), p. 67.
3The insurgents opposed Cummins on the grounds that he 
would have excessive power as both president pro tempore of
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revolt against party authority because Cummins fulfilled 
the seniority requirement, was chosen by the Republican 
Committee on Committees, and confirmed by the Republican 
conference. Because the Midwest senators held the balance 
of power in the Senate, they were able to prevent the 
election of a chairman and paralyze legislative proceedings 
for a month. The impasse was terminated on January 9» 1924, 
when Edwin F« Ladd (N.D.), Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.), Smith W. 
Brookhart (Iowa), and Robert M. La Follette (Wis.) voted 
with the Democrats to elect Ellison D, Smith (S.C.) committee 
chairman. This was the only time in the 1920's that insur­
gency was invoked to obstruct party selection of committee 
chairman.^
La Follette completed his rupture with the party in 
1924 when he accepted the Progressive party presidential 
nomination. North Dakotans Ladd and Frazier actively
the Senate and chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee. 
They also argued that the 1922 elections repudiated the 
Esch-Cummins Act, and the author of the Act should not pre­
side over the committee responsible for railroad legislation. 
To these arguments, the regulars rejoined that the insurgents 
were La Follette supporters and only interested in an issue 
for the 1924 presidential election. The debate may be found 
in the New York Times for December 11, 16, 17» 1923*
^The votes taken for chairman are in the Cong. Record, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1923-24, LXV, Part 1, 159rW ’. For a 
terse summary of the controversy see Berdahl, American Poli­
tical Science Review, XLIII, No. 2, 320.
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supported him, but at the same time disavowed the charge 
that they were leaving the Republican party. Brookhart of 
Iowa did not work publicly for La Follette, but he refused 
to endorse Calvin Coolidge for which he was read out of his 
state Republican organization. After the election, the 
party conference resolved to punish La Follette and the 
others by assigning them to committees as members of a third 
party which would cost them their committee seniority, 
and excluding them from the party conference.5
In emulation of the 1924 defectors, three Republican 
.senators refused to support Herbert Hoover in the 1928 
presidential election. John J. Blaine and Robert M« La 
Follette, Jr., both of Wisconsin, and Nebraskan George W. 
Norris were not, however, officially disciplined for their 
insurgency. They continued their committee assignments 
without loss of seniority, but their power was diminished 
by the simple expedient of increasing the number of reliable 
members on their committees. This exceedingly mild and 
inconsequential rebuke failed to ignite the fierce debate
•5James Henry Shideler, The Neo-Progressives: Reform 
Politics in the United States, 1920-1925 (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of History, University of California 
(Berkeley), 1945), pp. 274-76, examines the insurgents posi­
tions in the 1924 election. In the sequel over punishment 
of the bolters see Berdahl, American Political Science Review, 
XLIII, No. 3, 492-6. Cong. Record, ~68th Cong.-, 2n Sess.,
1924, LXVI, Part 1, 10-71, has germane dialogue on the 
punishment of the bolters and the obligations of party mem­
bership.
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that took-place when punitive measures were taken against 
the 1924 bolters.^
A small Midwestern group extended their insurgency 
to opposition of major partisan appointments. Perhaps the 
most reliable gauge of their intransigency was their objec­
tion to appointments in which members of the same party as 
the president usually acquiesce in his judgment,’'7 Norris 
alone had the distinction of voting against confirmation of 
every major appointment proposed by Presidents Harding and 
Coolidge. Frazier opposed all four prospective appointments 
upon which he voted. Brookhart was nearly as implacable by 
voting against the confirmation of three out of four pro­
spective appointees. Peter Norbeck (S.D.) was less 
obstructionist, but he opposed administration candidates 
three times on six votes. La Follette voted twice on four 
occasions against administration appointees. No other Repub­
lican senator voted to reject more than one nominee. Republi 
can opposition to major partisan appointments was not massive
^Berdahl, supra, pp. 504-05.
?The appointments are George Harvey as Ambassador to 
Great Britain, Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921,
XLI, Part 1, 369; Pierce Butler to Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Ibid., 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 1922, LXIV, Part 
l/8l3; Frank B. Kellogg as Ambassador to Great Britain, 
Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1923, LXV, Part 1, 235; Harlan 
Fiske Stone to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Ibid., 
68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1925, LXVI, Part 3, 3057 and; Charles 
Warren as Attorney-General, Ibid., 69th Cong., Special Sess., 
1925, LXVII, Part 1, 101, 275.
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but these few Middle West incorrigibles demonstrated a 
persistent hostility to administration choices for vital 
government positions.
The final requirement of party regularity is that a 
legislator vote with his party when partisanship itself is 
an issue. It seemed probable that partisanship would be 
most intense upon Senate investigations that could prove 
embarrassing to one of the parties and upon votes to over­
ride presidential vetoes. Neither of these produced either' 
the party positions or the voting alignments that were 
expected. The highly publicized Senate investigation of 
oil leases, which exposed corruption in the Harding cabinet, 
was authorized without Republican dissent.^ Only one Repub­
lican opposed the resolution to investigate the nefarious 
activities of Attorney-General Harry A. Daugherty.9 When 
Republican Senator Arthur. R. Gould (Me.) was accused of 
bribery on behalf of a business client, only six members of 
his party opposed an investigation into the charges.10 
Republicans were in markedly less agreement over Senate 
investigatory powers and other proposed investigations, but
®Ibid., 6?th Cong., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 6 ,
6097.
9lbid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 4,
3410.
lOlbid., 69th Cong., 2n Sess., 1926, LXVIII, Part 1,
44.
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investigations which could result in adverse publicity did 
not in themselves generate strict partisan votes or divide 
Republicans along insurgent vis-a-vis regular lines.
Presidential vetoes neither awed the Republican 
senators into submission nor galvanized them into support 
of the administration. From the votes to override vetoes, 
which were selected for analysis, a majority of Republicans, 
except once, voted to nullify the executive veto.H Repub­
lican senators were obviously more in accord among themselves 
than with the executive. The votes, however, reflect a 
sectional division with an Eastern majority voting in every 
instance to sustain the vetoes whereas the Westerners, 
excluding the bill to increase postal workers' salaries, 
voted to override the veto. Senators, with the exception 
of most Easterners, were quite willing to defy their own 
executive on vetoes.
That there was some militant Republican insurgency in 
the 1920's is indisputable, but the evidence from this 
investigation modifies and refines the usual generalizations
^The Republican votes to override the veto of 
veterans' compensation bills were 27-21 and 30-171 Ibid.,
67th Cong., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 12, 12999-13000; and 
Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 9, 8871. The 
veto of the rural post roads bill was opposed 19-17> Ibid., 
70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Part 9, 9673. Passage of 
the McNary-Haugen bill over the veto was approved 20-19.
Ibid., 9879. A Republican majority sustained the veto of a 
bill increasing postal workers' salaries by a 28-21 vote, 
Ibid., 68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1925. LXVI, Part 2, 1285.
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made about insurgency. It was neither practiced on the 
scale nor with the intensity that is often assumed. There 
were only a few "authentic’' insurgents, and they did not 
uniformly or consistently demonstrate obstruction or 
independence from their party. Insurgency was practiced in 
degrees. Insurgency is a continuum from mild and sporadic 
to intractable and chronic. The small force of genuine 
Western insurgents expressed the varigation within the 
continuum. The failure to describe insurgency as a matter 
of degree has been a basic cause of the conflicting histori­
cal impressions of the Midwesterners and Westerners.
There is a general attitude that insurgency is 
analogous with progressivism. The concepts, however, are 
mutually exclusive: insurgency describes the relationship of 
the politician to his party whereas progressivism denotes 
his political ideology. There is both a philosophical and 
historical origin behind the equation of the two concepts.
A reverent American tradition is distrust of professional 
politicians. The belief became universal that elected 
officials should mirror the will of the people while the 
attitude crystallized into a dogma that party loyalty impeded 
popular expression. Whatever the reality, independent 
politicians became meshed with the idea of sovereignty of the 
electorate and, therefore, with progressivism. Historically, 
insurgency was first used to describe the Liberal Republicans
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and Mugwumps who broke from the party in the late 19th 
century. The term was used in subsequent generations to 
identify recalcitrant Republicans from the West. Because of 
their political and economic programs they were also called 
p r o g r e s s i v e s . - ^  it is natural to see continuity between 
these Westerners and their heirs, but it is not perforce 
valid.
The preponderance of historians assert that progressi- 
vism persisted throughout the 1920's, and that the Midwestern 
and Western insurgents were its most articulate exponents.
If this conclusion is valid, it should be reflected in the
votes on progressive issues. Assuming that insurgency and
progressivism are analogous, then the insurgents should be 
in unanimous support of these issues and the regulars who are 
portrayed as conservatives should be opposed. It has been 
asserted that progressive legislation in the 1920's included 
Farm Bloc programs, immigration restriction, prohibition, 
and public power. -^3 An investigation of the voting patterns
-*-^ Moos, The Republicans, p. 253.
3-3Link, American Historical Review, LXIV, No. 8^5-
8. Admittedly, other issues could~be selected which might 
reflect the voting pattern presumed to exist according to 
the usual arguments. It is simply proposed that it was not 
present, to a pronounced degree, on these issues. Even if the 
dichotomy should appear upon other issues, it does not 
invalidate the contention herein that there cannot be a 
categorical assumption that insurgents vote differently from 
regulars on progressive issues. The conclusion from this 
vote analysis is not pronounced as final, but is only 
suggested as a basis for further investigation.
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on these issues reveals that the division between the 
insurgents and regulars, except upon public power, was minor.
To an extent, this examination of voting patterns is 
negative because it fails to contribute to forming criteria 
of progressivism. The purpose is to ascertain whether 
insurgency is relevant to progressivism. It is true that 
the senators known as insurgents vote upon these issues in 
the predicted way, but the regulars vote almost the same and 
analyses of the 1920cs do not contain references to regular- 
progressives. Insurgency and regularity and progressivism 
and conservatism may appear together in any combination.
The sole Farm Bloc objective was economic relief for 
the devoutly capitalistic middle-class farmer. Perception 
of the agrarian group as an authentic and doctrinaire 
insurgent-progressive instrumentality overlooks its narrow 
interests and diverse membership. The Bloc was disinterested 
in issues unrelated to agriculture and, outside of agreement 
upon the need for agricultural relief, the membership held 
widely divergent political and economic dogmas. Senators 
styled as insurgents and progressives were active in the 
Bloc, but so were regulars and "Tories," including Frank B, 
Kellogg (Minne.), John Harreld (Okla.), and Robert Stanfield 
(Ore.). There was broad support for agricultural legislation 
which gives the votes a different composition than is some­
times assumed. An overwhelming majority of Republican
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senators, irrespective of ideology or regularity, voted for 
the farm measures.1^
Curtailment of European immigration had nearly 
unanimous approval from Republican senators. No Republican 
voted against the temporary immigration bill and only two 
opposed the permanent legislation.15 Although it has been 
argued that making the United States impregnable to European 
immigrants was simply the culmination of a progressive 
proposal, the debates and votes reflect more than progressive 
attitudes. Public opinion, infused with nativism and hyper- 
.patriotism, was reflected in the Senate where both insurgents 
and regulars concurred in the need to "protect” the United 
States through immigration restriction. The attitudes 
reflected in drastic curtailment of immigration did not 
represent progressivism alone, but were also expressions of 
militant Americanism, racism, and isolationism.
The visualization of prohibition as a progressive 
triumph is dubious. Although some insurgents and progressives
■^Republicans voted 56-1 for the Emergency Tariff, Cong. 
Record, 67th Cong. 1st Sess., 1921, LXI, Part 2, 1308. They 
voted 31-6 for the Packers and Stockyards bill, Ibid., Part 
5, Provision for an agricultural member of the Federal
Reserve Board was approved -^1-7, Ibid., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, 
Part 2, 1270. The Capper-Volstead bill had unanimous support 
36-0, Ibid., Part 3» 2282. Republicans approved the 
Fordney-McCumber Tariff ^5-1» Ibid., Part 11, 11627.
15Ibid., 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921, LXI, Part 1, 968; 
Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 192^, LXV, Part 7# 664*9.
Ill
believed that prohibition was a vital reform measure, others 
found prohibition intolerable on expedient and personal 
grounds* Regulars who are classified as conservatives were 
also deeply divided among themselves over prohibition. 
National prohibition was a legal reality by the 1920’s, and 
Republican senators, notwithstanding previous divisions, 
almost uniformly supported "dry’1 legislation. Only one vote 
on beer belies less than Republican unanimity on prohibi­
tion, and the basic division on this vote was not ideological 
but sectional with Eastern senators generally voting "wet" 
and senators from the other sections voting "dry."l6 
The public power controversy during the 1920's 
focused upon the disposition of the government dams and 
nitrogen plants at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. In the Senate, 
the Muscle Shoals debate had two stages. Norris was able, 
in the initial stage, to prevent the leasing of the Muscle 
Shoals complex to Henry Ford, even though many senators and 
farm groups believed in the industrialist's plan to trans­
form the Tennessee Valley through private enterprise. By 
indefatigable effort, Norris secured majorities in the 
second phase for government operation.
^Representative votes on prohibition include Ibid., 
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1925, LXV, Part 4, ^-80^-5; Ibid. ,
69th Cong., 2n Sess., 1927, LXVIII, Part 5, 53^6; and Ibid., 
?0th Cong., 2n Sess., 1929, LXX, Part 37^2. Republicans 
voted their approval 33-1, 38-1, and 36-5 respectively. The 
vote on beer was 27-1^ -, Ibid. . 67th Cong., 1st Sess,, 1921, 
LXI, Part 5, 47^2.
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There were three major votes on Muscle Shoals, The 
first vote was on private operation; it was passed with 
Republicans nearly equally divided except for the Easterners 
who gave their unanimous approval to the measure. Midwestern 
and Western senators usually identified as insurgents 
opposed private operation and the regulars voted for it. The 
remaining votes were on government operation. On one vote, 
the traditional insurgents and about one-half of the regu­
lars voted for passage. The second vote reflected a pro­
nounced shift by the Midwest regulars to vote against 
.furthering the scope of government operations. This is the 
only issue upon which the votes nearly conform to the pre­
dicted pattern, and even upon this issue the regulars 
sometimes fail to vote in the anticipated way.4?
The vote analysis of Farm Bloc programs, immigration 
restriction, prohibition, and Muscle Shoals does not substan­
tiate the presence of a graphic insurgent-progressive and 
regular-conservative cleavage. There is nearly universal 
approval from the Republican senators for three of the four 
issues. If support of these measures is a true reflection 
of progressivism, then the regulars are only slightly less
l?The Republican vote was 34-13 for private operation, 
Ibid., 68th Cong., 2n Sess,, 1925> LXVI, Part 2, 1808. On 
government operation the votes were 20-15 and 16-22, Ibid., 
70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Part 4, 4635; Ibid., Part 
9, 9842.
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progressive than the insurgents. Progressivism, in the same 
way as party regularity, is a matter of degree and simply 
because the regulars failed to support every aspect of one of 
the four progressive proposals it would not make them cate- 
gorically conservative. The relationship between insurgency 
and progressivism seems quite tenuous.
The major conclusions in this chapter, drawn from 
voting data and the application of criteria, are the bases 
for reanalysis of the nature of Republican insurgency. In a 
discipline where truth is often somewhere between the extreme 
interpretations, it would seem that both groups of historians 
in contention made judgments with respect to insurgency that 
have validity. There was authentic, truculent Republican 
insurgency in the 1920*s which was a salient aspect of 
politics. It is proposed, however, in sympathy with the more 
current revisionist position, that insurgency was practiced 
by fewer Republicans with less consistency and intensity than 
is usually expounded in the standard thesis. Some Republi­
can senators who have been classified as insurgents were at 
the most only marginal independents. Especially after 1925> 
with the demise of some militants, the majority of remaining 
"independents” were usually tepid insurgents.
CHAPTER VI
A STUDY OF SECTIONAL VOTING PATTERNS
Pervasive sectional discord in national politics is a 
standard historical theme for the 1920's. Tersely stated, 
the usual interpretation is that sectionalism, rooted in 
economic and ideological differences, generated political 
clashes of sharp intensity and vast proportions. Sectional 
conflict was present in both political parties. Within the 
Republican party, the Eastern manufacturing, finance, and 
• transportation interests struggled for power with the Western 
agrarian groups. The Democrats were divided into an urban, 
Catholic, immigrant, wet wing and a rural, protestant, 
nativist, dry bloc. Although this sectional thesis has almos 
categorical acceptance by historians, there is no major study 
which measures the sectional influences on Senate voting.
This analysis: (1) determines the sectional pattern of Senate 
votes and compares the influence of section with party; and 
(2) measures the likeness between geographical regions and 
sectional groups within both parties.
Party affiliation was the predominant influence 
reflected in Senate voting patterns. No sectional group had 
the comparable unity of either the Republicans or Democrats. 
This is verified through a comparison of sectional vis-a-vis 
party cohesion. The table below presents the cohesion for
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geographical regions in all Congresses in the 1920's. The 
data on sectional unity complements that on party solidarity.
TABLE 17
COHESION INDEX FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
REGIONS, 1921-29
Congress Region
East South Central West
6? 39.0 26.0 31.0 27.0-
68 44.0 37.0 55.0 37.0
69 48,0 41.0 50.0 33.0
70 50.0 45.0 50.0 44.0
Totals 45.3 37.3 46.5 35.3
.Generally, sectional cohesion increased throughout the 1920's 
which paralleled a decline in party unity. Although sec­
tionalism did not supplant party affiliation as the primary 
impetus on senatorial voting, it was a more pronounced factor 
than usual during the 1920's.
Changes in issues and Senate personnel seem to be the 
fundamental causes for the intensified sectional voting trend. 
There was a type of Eastern and Western Republican alliance, 
primarily on foreign policy, the tariff, and farm measures, 
early in the era. This arrangement was ruptured in later 
Congresses over issues— Muscle Shoals and McNary-Haugen 
proposals are ideal illustrations— which generated alignments 
along sectional rather than party lines. The increase in the 
number of low loyalty Republican senators also contributed to
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the decline in party cohesion, and to giving the votes a 
more sectional character, especially as these senators were 
only from the West. The cause for increased sectionalism 
among the Democrats is more difficult to ascertain from 
the votes. Much of the early Democratic unity certainly 
came from their opposition to the Republicans over tradi­
tional party issues, i.e., the tariff. After the 67th 
Congress, there is a significant reduction of Democratic 
cohesion. Perhaps the most valid explanation for this is 
that it was a reflection of growing tension between the two 
Democratic wings over issues that were not especially related 
to the votes in the Senate.
To discern the bases of sectional unity, or lack of 
it, a more thorough investigation is required both of 
sectional cohesion and the solidarity of the sectional 
parties. The following section presents cohesion indices, 
with brief analysis, for the sections and parties by issue 
and Congress.
The Central States senators had more voting solidarity 
than any other sectional group. Their cohesion was quite 
high on many issues, and they were the most unified group on 
Senate procedure, agriculture, welfare, business-industry- 
banks, veterans' compensation, legislative compensation, 
investigations, and race. The Midwesterners were the most 
unified on eight issues, but this was second to the Easterners
11?
who had. the highest cohesion on nine issues. It is somewhat 
surprising that the Central States senators demonstrate 
unity upon the issues that they do. With the exception of 
agriculture, upon which they are slightly more in accord 
than the Easterners, the Midwesterners lack close affinity 
upon issues vital to their section. Perhaps it is natural 
that they had most agreement upon issues relevant to other 
sections because these issues would not aggravate Middle West 
intra-sectional tensions. Moreover, they might be expected 
to be more unified in expressing antipathy toward interests 
•outside their section. The general pattern for the 1920*s 
is for a section to be more cohesive in its external policy 
than united in the solution of its own internal problems.
There are less ideological reasons for the high Mid­
western cohesion. The sectional contingent was almost ex­
clusively Republican and never included more than two Demo­
crats during the 1920's. Sectional interparty conflict was, 
therefore, on a small scale compared to the other geographi­
cal groups, and this was reflected in high cohesion. Even 
though some Republicans from the section had irregular voting 
patterns, party affiliation was still the paramount influ­
ence on the way that most of them voted. The general rule 
for understanding sectional cohesion is that it is determined 
by the political composition of the senatorial delegation.
As two party competition increased within a section during 
the 1920's, the voting solidarity of the section decreased.
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The Midwest was the most politically homogeneous and had the 
highest sectional cohesion whereas the West had the most 
equal party representation and the lowest sectional cohesion. 
The cohesion index for the Central States senators follows.
TABLE 18
COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES SENATORS 






Tariff 15.0 11.0 56.0 27.3
■Senate Organization 21.0 37.0 40.0 21.0 29.8
Appropriations 20.0 36.0 43.0 41.0 35.0
Tax-Revenue 19.0 50.0 46 • 0 28.0 35.8
Public Works 11.0 53.0 47.0 36.0 36.8
Public Power 44.0 32.0 43.0 39.7
Appointments 37.0 60.0 63.0 6.0 41.5
Senate Procedure 20.0 42.0 61.0 49.0 43.0
Military Affairs 30.0 41.0 48.0 62.0 45.3
Government Organization 26,0 66.0 39.0 58.0 47.3
Business-Industry-Banks 20.0 65.O 50.0 55.0 47.5
Agriculture 32.0 33.0 67.0 63.0 48.8
Veterans* Compensation 34.0 54.0 66.0 51.3
Immigration 59.0 79.0 19.0 52.3
Investigations 25.0 76.0 66.0 55.0 55.5
Prohibition 39.0 71.0 60.0 56.7
Foreign Affairs 29.0 62.0 ■ 70o0 74.0 58.8
119
Welfare 75.0 6^.0 61.0




3102 5^.7 50.2 50.^
83.0
The high Midwestern cohesion distracts from the pro­
nounced Republican disunity within the section. The Central 
States Republicans were the most divided party group within 
any section. Their cohesion for all Congresses was only 
5^.25 with indices of 6^.00, 52.00, 50.00, and 51.00 in the 
67th through the 70th Congress. The exceedingly low Repub­
lican statistics on party loyalty issues especially illus­
trates the acute party irregularity within the Midwestern 
bloc. It is also valuable to identify the substantive 
issues which most divided them. These were business measures, 
tax policies, public works, and public power; issues which 
are sometimes perceived as dividing Republicans along ideo­
logical lines. In contrast to the Republicans, the central 
Democrats have as much unity as any sectional party. Because 
they were few in number, however, their cohesion is vir­
tually irrelevant to the general voting patterns. The 
cohesion of Midwestern Republicans and Democrats is presented 
in the following tables.
than the Midwesterners. Although they had less cohesion 
overall, the Easterners had more solidarity
The Eastern senators were only slightly less cohesive
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TABLE 19
COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES 







Appointments 55.0 41.0 33.0 12.0 35.3
Public Works 31.0 58.0 33.0 56.0 44.5
Tax-Revenue 48.0 30.0 45.0 63.0 46.5
Public Power 29.0 44.0 68.0 47.0
Business-Industry-Banks 57.0 54.0 40.0 42.0 48.3
Appropriations 75.0 43.0 42.0 35.0- 48.8
Tariff 68.0 67.0 12.0 49.0
Senate Organization 5 8.0 28,0 52.0 59.0 49.3
Military Affairs 44,0 49.0 61.0 48.0 50.5
Veterans* Compensation 63.0 48.0 43.0 51.3
Investigations 73.0 59.0 48.0 34.0 53.5
Agriculture 46.0 65.0 58.0 52.0 55.3
Government Organization 60.0 52.0 40.0 69.O 55.3
Foreign Affairs 77.0 45.0 53.0 47.0 55.5
Senate Procedure 70.0 47.0 60.0 53.0 57.5
Immigration 77.0 65.0 38.0 60.0
Prohibition 71.0 64.0 59.0 64.7
Welfare 72.0 76.0 78.0 75.3
Legislative Compensation 77.0 77.0
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Race 100.0 73.0 100.0 91o0
Totals 63.6 52.2 49.9 50.6
TABLE 20
COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES 







Welfare 57.0 11.0 50.0 39.3
Race 0.0 75.0 100.0 58.3
Appointments 73.0 83.0 100.0 0.0 64.0
Military Affairs 72.0 38.0 75.0 77.0 65.5
Appropriations 71.0 68.0 88.0 59.0 71.5
Business-Industry-Banks 44. 0 100.0 68.0 75.0 71.8
Senate Procedure 81.0 91.0 73.0 44.0 72.3
Senate Organization 100.0 97.0 57.0 36.0 72.5
Public Power 83.O 81.0 59.0 7^.3
Agriculture 76.0 50.0 91.0 86.0 75.8
Government Organization 62.0 80.0 75.0 88.0 76.3
Tariff 85.0 57.0 100.0 80.7
Prohibition 50.0 100.0 100.0 83.3
Public Works 100.0 67.O 78.0 100,0 86,3
Tax-Revenue 82.0 100.0 85.O 86.0 88.3
Foreign Affairs 63.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 89.0
Veterans* Compensation 91.0 92.0 100.0 9^.3
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Investigations 100.0 100.0 100.0 83.0 95.8
Legislative Compensation 100.0 100.0
Totals 72.6 79.3 76.2 74.6
on more issues than the Central States senators. The nine
issues upon which they were most united were foreign affairs, 
military programs, appointments, government organization, 
immigration, tax measures, appropriations, public works, and 
public power. The relatively high Eastern cohesion can be 
fundamentally attributed to Republican domination of the 
section, and to habitual Republican party regularity. The 
minor Democratic opposition was more than offset by Republican 
hegemony and conformity to enable a high degree of sectional 
affinity. Eastern cohesion is presented in the following 
table.
TABLE 21
COHESION INDEX FOR THE EASTERN SENATORS 







Tariff 19.0 19.0 0.0 12.7
Senate Organization 21.0 12.0 46 . 0 5 . 0 21.0
Investigations 30.0 61.0 20.0 12.0 30.8
Welfare 60,0 15 .0 29.0 34 . 7
Tax-Revenue 21.0 44 . 0 55 * 0 34 . 0 38 . 5
Senate Procedure 31.0 37 . 0 52.0 4 0 . 0 4o.o
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Bus ine s s“Indus try-Banks 36.0 35*0 41.0 51*0 40.8
Legislative Compensation 41.0 41.0
Appropriations 37*0 36.0 50.0 42.0 41.3
Public Power 44.0 45*0 38.0 42.3
Agriculture 30.0 55* 0 50.0 50.0 46.3
Prohibition 74.0 30.0 35*0 46.3
Veterans* Compensation 51*0 48,0 46.0 48.3
Military Affairs 46.0 33*0 50.0 71.0 50.0
Public V/orks 20.0 35*0 73*0 73*0 50.3
Government Organization 30.0 60.0 73*0 68.0 57*8
Immigration 69.0 58.0 51.0 59*3
Foreign Affairs 30.0 44.0 87.0 84.0 61.3
Appointments 45.0 68.0 38.0 100.0 62,8
Race 50.0 58.0 100.0 69.3
Totals 38*9 43.6 4 7.5 50.2
Eastern senators of both parties were much more dis-
posed toward unity along political rather than sectional 
lines. The Eastern Republicans had more affinity among 
themselves than Republicans from the other sections. Only 
the Central States Democrats had equal cohesion with the 
Eastern Republicans, and the paucity of the former makes 
this a dubious comparison. The Republicans from the East, 
in sequence from the 67th through the 70th Congress, had 
cohesion of 79°00, 72.00, 72.00, and 79*00 for a 75*50 
average.
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The cohesion of Eastern Democrats was exceeded o n l y  
by their Midwest associates. Two Republican groups, Easter­
ners and Southerners, although there were only a few of the 
latter, had more unity than Democrats from the East, The 
average Democratic cohesion was 70.00 for all Congresses 
during the 1920*s. For the 67th through the 70 Congress in 
order, the Eastern Democratic cohesion was 78.00, 58.00, 
71.00, and 73*00.
The first of the following tables presents the Eastern 
Republican, and the second gives the Eastern Democratic 
•cohesion for each Congress and issue from 1921 through 1929*
TABLE 22
COHESION INDEX FOR EASTERN REPUBLICANS FOR EACH 
ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929
Issue Congre ss Totals
67 68 69 70
Welfare 62.0 28.0 37.0 k2.J>
Prohibition ^9.0 *H.O 36.0 k2,0
Public Works 55*0 28.0 79.0 55*0 5k. 3
Immigration 82.0 65.0 19.0 55*3
Military Affairs 73*0 55.0 5^.0 87*0 67*3
Public Power 71.0 71.0 7k. 0 72,0
Veterans* Compensation 61.0 78.0 81.0 73*3
Legislative Compensation 73*0 73*0
Agriculture 78.0 70.0 68.0 85.0 75*3
Investigations 89.0 67.0 65.O 8^,0 76.3
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Business“Industry-Banks 74.0 94.0 62.0 82.0 78.0
Senate Procedure 84.0 86.0 85.O 6 0.0 78.8
Government Organization 81.0 73.0 97.0 64,0 78.8
Appropriations 80.0 77.0 98.0 71.0 81.5
Tax“Revenue 85.0 83.0 87.0 79.0 83.5
Foreign Affairs 93.0 63.0 87.O 100.0 85.8
Senate Organization 92.0 99.0 83.0 90.0 91.0
Tariff 8?.0 89.0 100.0 92.0
Appointments 99.0 86.0 90.0 100.0 93.8
Race 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Totals 79.0 72.0 71.8 79.2
TABLE 23
C O H E S I O N  I N D E X  F O R  
I S S U E  A N D
E A S T E R N  
C O N G R E S S ,
D E M O C R A T S  F O R  
1921-1929






Legislative Compensation 19.0 19.0
Public Power 32.0 43.0 47.0 40.7
Welfare 67.0 10.0 54.0 43.7
Senate Procedure 70.0 59.0 45.0 20.0 48.5
Race 34.0 47.0 100.0 60.3
Appropriations 71.0 63.0 58.0 71.0 65.8
Veterans' Compensation 82.0 41.0 74.0 65.7
Agriculture 77.0 79.0 63.0 47.0 66.5
Business-Industry-Banks 89.0 69.0 62.0 47.0 66.8
Prohibition 100.0 3 7 o 0 65.0 67.3
126
Military Affairs 68.0 4-5 o0 84.0 73.0 67.5
Public Works 45,0 54.0 82.0 92.0 68.3
Tax-Revenue 92.0 6l,0 77.0 74.0 76.0
Foreign Affairs 85.0 64.0 86.0 69.0 76.0
Immigration 7 8.0 73.0 83.0 7 8.0
Government Organization 81.0 72.0 100.0 72.0 81.3
Tariff 88,0 59.0 100.0 82.3
Appointments 79.0 81.0 83.0 100.0 85.8
Senate Organization 100.0 75.0 89.0 100.0 91.0
Investigations 100.0 100.0 91.0 95.0 96.5
Totals 78.1 58.0 70.6 73.3
The popular idea of a monolithic Southern bloc is re­
futed by this study. Southerners were less unified than the 
Eastern and Midwestern senators, and had only slightly more 
affinity than the Westerners. Prohibition was the only issue 
upon which they had more accord than the other groups. The 
low Southern cohesion is the result of many diverse interests 
in a geographical area often believed homogeneous. The 
definition of South in this study, which includes both border 
and Confederate states, may also contribute to the low sec­
tional cohesion. This may have increased the antithetical 
groups over the number usually defined as Southern. A differ­
ent pattern of party representation, than what is usually 
thought of, may have also reduced Southern cohesion during 
the 1920's. Many Republicans, who were tenacious party
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regulars, were elected from border states which broadened 
interparty sectional conflict. Southern cohesion is given 
in the table below.
TABLE 24-
COHESION INDEX FOR THE SOUTHERN SENATORS FOR EACH 




68 6 9 70
Totals
Senate Organization 12,0 1.0 28.0 12.0 13.3
Tariff 13.0 8.0 4-3.0 21.3
Tax-Revenue 15.0 32.0 4-8.0 28.0 30.8
Investigations 18.0 39.0 4-2.0 27.0 31.5
Appropriations 25.0 27.0 27.0 4-9.0 32.0
Legislative Compensation 32.0 32.0
Agriculture 16.0 36.0 35.0 4-7.0 33.5
Business-Industry-Banks 22.0 37.0 36.0 4-0.0 33.8
Race 64-.0 7.0 35.0 35.3
Appointments 17.0 63.0 34-.0 32.0 36.5
Public Power 32.0 38.0 4-1.0 37.0
Senate Procedure 22.0 33.0 4-6.0 57.0 39.5
Veterans' Compensation 32.0 37.0 51.0 40.0
Immigration 38.0 50.0 32.0 40.0
Welfare 38.0 37.0 50.0 41.7
Public Works 20.0 4-8.0 4-1.0 58.0 41.8
Government Organization 17.0 4-6.0 65.0 44-. 0 43.0
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Military Affairs 28.0 45.0 37.0 62.0 43.0
Foreign Affairs 18.0 57.0 59.0 72.0 51.5
Prohibition 50.0 59.0 76.0 61.7
Totals 25.8 3 6.6 40.9 45.2
Within the Democratic Party, only the Westerners,
by a very slight degree, had less cohesion than the South­
erners. There were only two sectional political groups in 
both parties with less solidarity than the Southern Democrats. 
The belief in Southern Democratic unanimity is a myth in the 
1920's. In contrast with the Democrats, Southern Republicans 
had a high degree of solidarity. Their impressive unity 
could be somewhat attributed to the relatively few Southern 
Republicans being analyzed. The Republican senators, however, 
are an exceedingly homogeneous group and tenaciously committed 
to the dominant party positions. Cohesion indices for 
Southern Democrats and Republicans are presented in the 
following tables.
TABLE 25
COHESION INDEX FOR SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS 







Legislative Compensation 37.0 32.0
Public Power 37.0 34.0 51.0 40.7
Welfare 61.0 35.0 55.0 50.3
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Prohibition 40.0 66.0 52.0 52.7
Senate Procedure 63.0 61.0 60.0 36.0 55.0
Immigration 75 c0 59.0 38.0 57.3
Agriculture 60,0 48,0 66.0 61.0 58.8
Military Affairs 61.0 48,0 73.0 61.0 60.8
Government Organization 66,0 54.0 74.0 50.0 61,0
Foreign Affairs 59.0 69.0 67.0 61.0 64.0
Appropriations 69.0 78.0 61.0 62,0 67.5
Business-Banks-Industry 71.0 88,0 67.0 52.0 69.5
Race 100,0 81.0 30.0 70.3
Appointments 71.0 87.0 69.0 64.0 72.8
Veterans* Compensation 53.0 81.0 91.0 75.0
Tax-Revenue 83.0 92.0 59.0 69.0 75.8
Public Works 83.0 90.0 62.0 71.0 76.5
Tariff 80,0 85.0 86.0 83.7
Senate Organization 91.0 99.0 71.0 83.0 86.0
Investigations 82,0 100.0 89.0 95.0 91.5
Totals 70.4 69.1 65.9 61,5
TABLE 26
COHESION INDEX FOR SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS FOR 
EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929
Issue Congress Totals
67 68 69 70
Immigration 91.0 66,0 25.0 60,7
Veterans* Compensation 34.0 73*0 77.0 6l,3
Prohibition 38.0 51.0 100,0 63.0
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Public Works 74.0 39.0 75.0 72.0 65.0
Agriculture 69.0 73.0 59.0 62.0 65.8
Public Power 53.0 79.0 68.0 66.7
Investigations 78.0 78.0 47.0 78.0 70.3
Tax-Revenue 81.0 51.0 78.0 74.0 71.0
Military Affairs 71.0 55.0 80.0 86.0 73.0
Business-Industry-Banks 66.0 80.0 69.0 79.0 73.5
Foreign Affairs 80.0 51.0 64.0 100.0 73.3
Government Organization 73.0 62.0 100.0 67.0 75.5
Appropriations 82.0 82,0 100.0 65.0 82.3
Tariff 86.0 80.0 83.0
Senate Procedure 83.0 83.0 91.0 78.0 83.8
Welfare 88.0 70.0 95.0 84.3
Senate Organization 81.0 99.0 75.0 91.0 86.5
Appointments 93.0 80,0 89.0 87.3
Legislative Compensation 100.0 100.0
Race 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Totals 76.0 71.9 74.1 70.0
Westerners were the least unified. sectional group.
Senate organization and tariff were the only issues upon 
which the West had more cohesion than the other sections. 
Western disunity basically stems from a competitive two- 
party system within the region. The West was the only 
section in the 1920*s where this condition existed. 
Although both Western Republicans and Democrats were quite
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fragmented, there was enough party regularity to produce low 
sectional cohesion. The statistics are given in the table 
below,
TABLE 27
COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN SENATORS 







Immigration 16.0 35.0 9.0 20,0
Prohibition 7. 0 29.0 35.0 23.7
Foreign Affairs 31. 0 15.0 36.0 24-. 0 26.5
Welfare 11, 0 56.0 20.0 29.0
Military Affairs 27. 0 4i.o 10.0 42.0 30.0
Agriculture 25. 0 31.0 33.o 34-.0 30.8
Veterans* Compensation 16,0 54.0 25.0 31.7
Government Organization 29. 0 36.0 44.0 28.0 34.3
Business-Indus try-Banlcs 29. 0 27.0 4-3.0 37.0 34.0
Public Works 28. 0 4-7.0 36.0 28.0 34.8
Appointments 35. 0 4-5.0 27.0 33.0 35.0
Senate Procedure 33. 0 35.o 39.0 34-.0 35.3
Appropriations 32. 0 37.o 28.0 4-4.0 35.3
Public Power 38.0 27.0 41.0 35.3
Senate Organization 35. 0 23.0 37.0 51.0 36.5
Tax-Revenue 36. 0 29.0 4-0.0 55.0 40.0
Investigations 34-.0 31.0 4-6.0 59.0 42.5
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Legislative Compensation 48.0 48.0
Bace 25.0 46.0 83.0 51.3
Totals 26.9 37.4 32.7 44.3
Both Western parties are relatively disunified.
Western Democrats have the least cohesion of any sectional 
Democratic group; and Central States Republicans are the 
only geographical group with less solidarity. Western Repub­
licans were nearly as divisive as their Democratic counter­
parts. Only the Miditfestern Republicans and Western Democrats 
were more fragmented than the Western Republicans. Western 
party cohesion is presented in the following tables.
TABLE 28
COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN DEMOCRATS FOR 






Public Power 54.0 49.0 44. 0 49.0
Agriculture 55.0 31.0 54.0 61.0 50.3
Immigration 52.0 67.0 38.0 52.3
Foreign Affairs 58.0 44.0 68.0 ^3. 0 53.3
Military Affairs 53.0 43.0 62.0 55. 0 53.3
Prohibition 54.0 53.0 5^. 0 53.7
Senate Procedure 71.0 65.0 47.0 35. 0 5^.5
Welfare 56.0 64.0 52.0 57.3
Appointments 71.0 67.0 63.O 3^. 0 58.8
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Government Organization 60,0 66,0 A7.0 69.0 60.5
Public Works 67.0 89.0 Ao.o 50.0 61.5
Tariff 60.0 50.0 78.0 62.7
Legislative Compensation 66,0 66,0
Appropriations 75.0 6 A. 0 67.0 59.0 66.3
Tax-Revenue 82,0 71.0 59.0 61.0 68.3
Business-Industry-Banks 67.0 100.0 61.0 56.0 71.0
Race 100,0 50.0 66.0 72.0
Veterans* Compensation 55.0 80.0 8A .0 73.0
Senate Organization 95.0 97.0 60.0 89.O 85.3
Investigations 100,0 100.0 96.0 100.0 99.0
Totals 68.A 67.7 58.3 59.6
TABLE 29
COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN REPUBLICANS 







Agriculture 55 . 0 AA.O 52.0 38.0 ^7.3
Public Power A6.0 39.0 6A.0 A9.7
Prohibition 30.0 58.0 62.0 50.0
Public Works AA.O 59 . 0 52.0 50.0 51.3
Veterans* Compensation 50.0 65.0 52.0 55.7
Business-Industry-Banks 67.O 60.0 62.0 Al.O 57.5
Immigration 86.0 68.0 19.0 57.7
Welfare 55 . 0 59 .0 61.0 58.3
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Investigations 77.0 73.0 30.0 56.0 59.0
Tax-Revenue 68.0 54.0 57.0 65.0 61.0
Military Affairs 55.0 67.0 62.0 69.0 63.3
Senate Procedure 79.0 45.0 76.0 54.0 63.5
Senate Organization 79.0 64,0 65.O 57.0 66.3
Foreign Affairs 74.0 46.0 76.0 82.0 69.5
Appropriations 77.0 63.0 93.0 60.0 73.3
Appointments 81.0 73.0 56.0 100.0 77.5
Government Organization 66«0 83.0 85.0 79.0 78.3
Tariff 79.0 81.0 84.0 81.3
Legislative Compensation 82.0 82.0
Race 86.0 80.0 100.0 88.7
Totals 67.1 62.8 59.8 66.3
The second principal objective in this chapter is an
analysis of voting mutuality between sectional groups. This 
study assesses the relative influence of party against sec­
tion on voting patterns, and examines the affinity between 
rural and urban geographical regions. The conclusions from 
this analysis support a slight revision of most historical 
Interpretations of sectional voting alignments in the 1920's.
This judgment is based upon the information contained 
within the six following tables. In sequence, the tables 
provide the voting likeness for: (1) Democrats and Republi­
cans from the same section; (2) Democratic sectional groups 
with each other; (3) Republican sectional groups with each
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other; (4-) sectional Republican groups with sectional 
Democratic groups; (5) likeness of urban and rural sections 
and comparison between the two; and (6) likeness between 
urban and rural sections upon selected issues.
TABLE 30
LIKENESS BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS 







LIKENESS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC SECTIONAL 
GROUPS, 1921-1929







Average Likeness Between All Sectional Groups 73.5
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TABLE 32
LIKENESS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN SECTIONAL 
GROUPS, 1921-1929







Average Likeness Between All Sectional Groups 76.9
TABLE 33
LIKENESS BETWEEN SECTIONAL GROUPS OF ONE
PARTY WITH SECTIONAL GROUPS OF THE
OTHER PARTY, 1921-1929
Sectional Groups Likeness
Eastern Democrats-Eastern Republicans 49.5
Central Republicans-Central Democrats 55.8
Southern Democrats-Southern Republicans 54.0
Central Democrats-Western Republicans 48.0
Southern Democrats-Western Republicans 59.0
Eastern Democrats-Southern Republicans 56.5
Central Democrats-Southern Republicans 75.0
Western Democrats-Southern Republicans 48.0
Eastern Democrats-Western Republicans 53.8
Western Democrats-Western Republicans 57.8
Western Democrats-Eastern Republicans 44.5
Western Democrats-Central Republicans 64.5
Eastern Democrats-Central Republicans 48.5
Southern Democrats-Eastern Republicans 44.5
Central Democrats-Eastern Republicans 44.5
Southern Democrats-Central Republicans 47.0
13?
TABLE 34
LIKENESS OF THE URBAN AND RURAL GROUPS 
AND THE LIKENESS BETWEEN THE URBAN 





(The Urban section includes only the Eastern groups. All
other groups are classified as Rural .)
TABLE 35
LIKENESS BETWEEN THE URBAN .AND RURAL


















An obvious conclusion from the preceding tables is
that party affiliation transcended sectional identification 
as the guide to the way most senators voted. No section had 
the likeness which even nearly approximated those of the
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political parties. There was, moreover, only one example of 
two sectional groups (Central and Southern Democrats) within 
the same party with less likeness than a sectional group 
which included both Republicans and Democrats. The signifi­
cance of this example is moot because of the paucity of 
Central Democrats who voted relatively few times.
Party membership as the major influence upon Senate 
votes can be perceived from another perspective. This 
involves an examination of the extent which Democratic and 
Republican sectional groups voted with sectional groups in 
their parties compared with the extent they voted with sec­
tional groups in the other party. In the Republican party, 
only the Southerners voted more with a sectional group in the 
Democratic party than with all sectional groups in their own 
party. The Southern Republicans had more likeness with the 
Central Democrats than the Central Republicans. This 
exception to the overall pattern is not exceedingly important 
because of the small numbers in both groups. Within the 
Democratic party, only the Central States senators, and the 
same qualifications apply here as before, voted more with 
some sectional groups in Republican party than Democratic 
sectional groups. They voted more with the Central and 
Southern Republicans than the Southern Democrats. These 
minor aberrations do not significantly distract from the 
general thesis that party was the paramount influence
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reflected in Senate voting patterns.
The urban-rural cleavage was both less intense and 
had more ramifications than is usually indicated in political 
histories of the 1920's. This examination revealed that 
neither the urban or rural geographical regions had the 
likeness comparable to the parties. Further comparison 
indicated that the rural groups had only slightly more affinity 
between themselves than they had collectively with the urban 
section. The urban section had decidely less agreement than 
the rural sections and less likeness than the urban with the 
rural sections. This is because the urban section includes 
only one Democratic and Republican group which reenforces 
the proposition that party was the major divisive force. 
Although a division existed between the urban and rural 
sections, it was not on the scale that is usually expressed.
The idea of a rural-urban division seems oversimplified. 
The salient disagreements appear to be between sectional 
groups, often within the same party, and these are not always 
between rural and urban sections. Only the relatively small 
degree of likeness between the Central and Eastern Republi­
cans implies a sharp urban-rural confrontation. The urban- 
rural likeness on substantive issues generally confirms this 
conclusion. There were only four issues, tariff, prohibition, 
public works, and agriculture, that seemed to produce urban- 
rural division and this was not drastic.
1^ 0
The conclusions in this chapter fundamentally comple­
ment those of the second chapter. Party affiliation was the 
basic determinant of Senate voting alignments in the 1920's. 
This does not totally negate the contention that sectional 
tension was present and distracted from party allegiance more 
than normal. Sectionalism was easily perceivable in the 
votes and it became an increasingly disruptive factor in 
politics with each subsequent Congress in the 1920's, For 
proper perspective, however, even when sectionalism was most 
obvious, it was unequivocally a secondary influence upon 
voting behavior.
CONCLUSION
This dissertation was an examination of salient 
political currents in the United States during the 1920's.
The objective was to test, refine and revise common his­
torical descriptions of national politics through an analysis 
of party and sectional voting patterns in the American 
Senate* The usual historical themes emphasize the inordinate 
fragmentation of the Republican and Democratic parties which 
were afflicted with acute ideological and sectional fissures. 
These characterizations, based upon the traditional methodo­
logy and evidence, were reanalyzed and reconstructed primarily 
through statistical measurement and conceptual criteria.
Even where the standard interpretations were verified, this 
analysis contributed substantive information on voting 
patterns.
The major objective in this study was to determine the 
effect of party affiliation upon voting behavior. A valuable 
result of this analysis was that vague statements on party 
cohesion were supplanted with exact measurements. It was 
confirmed through statistical computation that the political 
parties had less unity than usual during the 1920*s. This 
analysis, however, accomplished more than to merely reenforce 
the all but universal thesis. The measurement of party 
affinity through different statistical indices enabled the 
delineation of major voting schemes. It was proved that
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party membership, although a less salient factor in Senate 
voting, was the most important determinant of the way that 
most senators voted. Party cohesion, it must be emphasized, 
did vary appreciably according to the issue and Congress,
Both the Republicans and Democrats deviated nearly the same 
degree from the party solidarity "norm." The former were 
less unified than the latter which was consistent with voting 
trends over several generations, Party unity declined for 
both political parties in each succeeding Congress from 1921 
through 1929* This seemed to result from the introduction of 
•new issues, different Senate membership, and party relations 
outside the Congress. An exceedingly relevant conclusion 
from this investigation was that each party had its 01m  
peculiar kind of fragmentation. Although there were marked 
differences in party solidarity contingent upon issue and 
chronology, Democrats generally were more united upon party 
loyalty issues than substantive matters whereas the Repub­
licans reflected the reverse pattern.
Because the indices used to measure party affinity 
fail to isolate the voting profile of individual legislators, 
a loyalty index was constructed to gauge the influence of 
party affiliation upon each senator. The purpose was to ass­
ess the party regularity for individual senators in order to 
test the validity of historians* judgments on identification 
of party unreliables and their degree of intractability. With
14-3
few exceptions, senators traditionally classified as party 
irregulars are those with low loyalty percentages. Recalci­
trant political activity was nearly an exclusive Republican 
practice. Some Midwestern and Western Republican senators 
demonstrated pronounced voting unreliability. Several Demo­
crats had relatively low regularity percentages, but none 
opposed their party as flagrantly as the Republican incorri- 
gibles. The loyalty index information was the basis for a 
more intensive examination of Republican party discord.
Although the loyalty index is a valuable method for 
measurement of voting dependability, it does not either clar­
ify or define broad contours of party conduct or political 
ideology. A chapter, therefore, was exclusively given to the 
study of Republican political insurgency and its relationship 
to progressivism. A criteria of insurgency was applied to 
Republican senators to determine the scope and intensity of 
political rebellion. The conclusion was that some Republican 
Midwesterners engaged in obstruction and defiance of their 
party, but that insurgency had less dimension, frequency, 
and intensity in the 1920*s than historians have generally 
assumed. An ancillary conclusion was that voting irregular­
ity may be a significant indicator of more implacable forms 
of insurgency. No senator with an exceedingly high loyalty 
percentage violated the prescriptions for party loyalty. 
Although some senators voted consistently against their party
W i
without disavowal of party allegiance, only those senators 
who were in most chronic dissent also practiced other types 
of insurgency.
Historical definitions of progressivism are, whatever 
the theoretical reflection, finally translated into advocacy 
of concrete legislative programs, To determine the relation­
ship between insurgency and progressivism, the votes on 
progressive issues were analyzed to judge whether they pro­
duced a progressive-conservative division among Republican 
senators. No graphic ideological gulf was reflected on these 
selected Issues, which suggested that the association between 
insurgency and progressivism, although perhaps not without 
some basis, seemed tenous. This conclusion was reenforced 
by the evidence in an early chapter that Republican division 
was principally over party loyalty rather than substantive 
issues,
The objective of the final chapter was to determine the 
geographical influence upon Senate voting patterns. Those 
indices used to measure party cohesion were also employed 
to ascertain the unity both of sectional groups, without 
regard to party, and sectional party groups. This analysis 
substantiated that party affiliation and not sectional 
pressures and interests was the paramount guide to Senate 
voting. This conclusion, however, did not negate the common 
historical thesis that sectionalism was more pronounced
1^5
during the 1920*s than was normal. Sectional conflict was 
present, and it became more exaggerated in the voting scheme 
of each subsequent Congress.
This study both reenforces and modifies the standard 
historical descriptions of national politics during the 
1920’s. Although the fundamental interpretations are con­
firmed, they are expanded in scope, internally refined, and 
redefined with more precision. Perhaps the best defense of 
this dissertation is that refocused attention upon and 
delineated the general political pattern of the 1920's.
With the historical concentration upon party disruption, 
political insurgency, and active irregularity, it is easy to 
neglect the fundamental political trend. The political party 
continued to function in the 1920’s and to be the hey to 
voting behavior. In this respect, politics in the 1920's 
conform to, more than diverge from, the general scheme of 
American political history.
The conclusions from this study are not final or 
complete. Basic questions about politics of the 1920’s were 
raised and many went unanswered. This investigation may, 
however, provide a basis for departure into intensive 
research and reanalysis of "twenties" national politics.
If this dissertation indicates the need and opportunities 
for scholarly research in an absorbing decade it will have 
accomplished the writer's major objective.
a p p e n d i x a
APPENDIX A
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CHI-SQUARES 
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-29
DEMOCRATIC CHI-SQUARES FOR EACH ISSUE AND 








Senate Organization 13.02 18.70 9.21 15.87 14.20
Foreign Policy 6*21 4.02 9.58 8,06 6.97
Military Affairs 5.32 4.37 8.05 8.37 6.52
Tariff 8.21 — 9.13 17.39 11.91
Senate Procedure 6,12 8.44 4.67 2.34 5.39
Appointments
Government
7.40 12.90 8.08 5.88 8.56
Organization 5.79 6.48 9.04 4.60 6.48
Immigration 6.22 6.14 .05 — 4.13
Agriculture 5.09 2.61 5.61 5.55 4.71
Welfare
Business-Industry-
5.09 .78 2.91 2.92
Banks 7.62 15.25 5.57 5.98 8.61
Tax-Revenue 
Veterans *
9.83 13.41 6.09 9.59 9.73
Compensation 5.01 9.26 12,67 -- 8.98
Prohibition 1.60 6.5 0 2.09 3.40
Appropriations 
Pensions-Claims-
7.61 10.37 6.04 7.80 7.96
Compensation — - 1.41 -- 1.41
Public Works 8.70 6.29 4.52 6.92 6.61
Public Power 3.43 2.63 4.89 3.65
Investigations 12.72 19.79 15.13 19.05 16.67
Race 13.24 4.05 — .06 5.78
REPUBLICAN CHI- 
CONGRESS
SQUARES FOR EACH ISSUE 













































13.30 5.26 1 1 . 0 0
6. 6o 10.81 ' ^.55 8.72
9*07 8.39 8.05 10.04
7.70 12.44 7.68 9.56
9*58 .96 — 9.44
6.43 5.30 2.77 5.79
7.72 6.05 — 8.38
9.82 5.79 3.30 7.51
6. 6o 7.35 8.92 8.31
8.58 8.25 7.64
— 5.42 7.02 4.67
8.26 11.08 4.98 9.76
11.24 M — _  — 11.24
2.75 7.50 4.43 ^.93
3.71 4.71 6.49 ^.97




MAJOR SENATE OFFICERS AND 
PARTY LEADERS,
1921-29
President Pro Tempore of the Senate Dates
Albert B. Cummins (R-Iowa) 1921-25
George H, Moses (R.N.H,) 1925-29
Party Leadership
Republican Majority Leaders
Henry Cabot Lodge (Mass.) 1921-24
•Charles Curtis (Kansas) 1924-28
James E. Watson (Ind.) 1929
Republican Assistant Ma.jority Leaders
Charles Curtis (Kansas) 1921-24
Wesley L. Jones (Washington) 1924-29
Democratic Minority Leaders
Oscar W. Undersood (Ala.) 1921-23
Joseph T. Robinson (Arkansas) 1923-29
Democratic Assistant Ma.jority Leaders
Peter G. Gerry (R.I.) 1921-29
Senate Committee Chairman 
And Ranking Minority Member '"'(All Chairmen
all Republicans and 
Ranking members Demo­
crats unless otherwise 
indicated.)
RANKING
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN MINORITY MEMBER

















Francis E. Warren 
1921-29
































Lee S . Overman 
1921-29
Robert L. Owen 
1921-27
Duncan U. Fletcher 
1928-29
Duncan U. Fletcher 
1921-29
Lee S. Overman 
1921-29
Furnifold M. Simmons 
1921-29
William H, King 
1921-29
































William E. Borah 
1924




Albert B. Cummins 
1921-23







Tasker L. Oddie 
192^-29





Andrews A. Jones 
1921-27
Woodbridge N. Ferris 
1928
Royal S . Copeland
1928-29
William H. King 
1921-29
Charles A. Culberson 
1921-23
Lee S. Overman 
192^-29
Ellison D. Smith 
1921-24
Albert B. Cummins 
192^-25 
(Republican)
Thomas J. Walsh 
1921-29













Lynn J, Frazier 
1928-29
James W, Wadsworth 
1921-27
Francis E, Warren 
1927
David A. Reed 
1928-29






James E. Watson 
1927
Samuel M. Shortridge 
1928-29




Ovington E. Weller 
1927
Charles L. MeNary 
1927
George P. McLean 
1928-29
Henry F. Ashurst 
1921-29








William H, King 
1925-29



















Arthur R. Robinson 
1928-29
Charles E„ Townshend 
1921-23
Thomas A. Sterling 
192^-25














Harry S . New 
1921-23



















































Jesse H. Metcalf 
1927-29






















Ellison D. Smith 
1921-29
Duncan U. Fletcher 
1921-29
James A. Reed 
1921-29





Charles S. Deneed 
1928-29







^Select Richard P. Ernst
Committee on 1921-25
Revision of Laws 1926-27





Oscar W. Underwood 
1921-27
Claude A. Swanson 
1927-29
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